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CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA: BUILDING A BRIDGE ON THE
SILK ROAD NOT DETOURED BY LABOR STANDARD
PROVISIONS
Ronald C. Brown †
Abstract: It is time for European Union and Chinese leaders to build on the
existing EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, quickly conclude on-going
negotiations on their EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, and begin substantive
negotiations on an EU-China Free Trade Agreement? China is now the European Union's
second-biggest trading partner behind the United States, and the European Union is
China's biggest trading partner. China is reaching to become the leader in globalism and
is investing heavily to make it happen. One of the world’s largest projects, the Belt and
Road Initiative is a primary driver of China's larger development strategy. A key aim of
the BRI is to promote economic connectivity among countries in Eurasia by recreating
the historic Silk Road along several land corridors and sea routes. While the parts of the
project fit together like a giant jigsaw puzzle, one of the most important corridors is the
road between the European Union and China where China is the European Union's
biggest source of imports and its second-biggest export market. China is motivated to
address historic obstacles and seize the opportunities for growth. At the same time, China
can develop its own mega-regional free trade agreement as other such agreements grow
around them, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, while China’s
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and European Union’s Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership languish. China’s first step might be an EU-China free
trade agreement setting standards among the European Union’s 28 countries and China
and paving the Silk road with a model for the 68 countries touched by the BRI
encompassing about two-thirds of the world's population and 40% of global GDP. This
paper will compare and discuss the possible accommodations necessary to reconcile the
different approaches in free trade agreements by the European Union and China, with a
focus on labor standards and dispute resolution provisions in their existing free trade
agreements, in the context of current global obligations, including the International
Labour Organisation, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and
others.
Cite as: Ronald C. Brown, China-EU BIT and FTA: Building a Bridge on the Silk Road
Not Detoured by Labor Standard Provisions, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 61 (2019).
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INTRODUCTION

Background In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the
European Union and China to “actively explore” a bilateral free trade
agreement:
“Together we make up one-third of the global economy. We
must actively explore the possibility of a free trade area and the
goal of bringing [annual] bilateral trade to one trillion dollars
by 2020. . . . We must work to make China and the EU the twin
engines for global economic growth.”1
There are many reasons and opportunities why they should
contemplate an EU-China Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) at this time.
Against a background in which the United States is increasingly
drawing into question its commitments to free trade and the
global commons, and with the uncertainty resulting from
Brexit, there clearly exists a need for China and the EU not only
to increase the breadth and depth of their cooperation, but also
to act more strategically in the way they relate to each other. 2
There is increasing common interest and cooperation between the
European Union and China. European Council President, Donald Tusk, has
called for reform of the World Trade Organization, including new rules on
industrial subsidies and intellectual property rights, as Europe tries to form a

1

Shawn Donnan & Andrew Byrne, China Courts EU on Bilateral Trade Agreement, FIN. TIMES
(April 1, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/77dc2efc-b9b4-11e3-a3ef-00144feabdc0. See generally
Theresa Fallon, China's Pivot to Europe, 36 AM. FOREIGN POL’Y INT. 175 (2014) (The author urges caution
on understanding the many implications of such treaty arrangements).
2
ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO ET AL., EU-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO 2025: BUILDING A
COMMON FUTURE iv (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017). Britain (which may exit the EU
under its Brexit plan) and China are also discussing trade agreements. “Speaking to reporters in Beijing
after meeting British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the two
countries agreed to increase trade and investment. Hunt said Wang made an offer ‘to open discussions
about a possible free-trade deal between Britain and China post Brexit.’” China Open to Talks on FreeTrade Deal with Post-Brexit Britain, Visiting Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt Says, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (July 30, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2157389/free-tradeagenda-britains-new-foreign-minister-trip. See also ALICIA GARCIA-HERRERO & JIANWEI XU, WHAT
CONSEQUENCES WOULD A POST-BREXIT CHINA-UK TRADE DEAL HAVE FOR THE EU?, (Bruegel, 2016),
https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/PC_18_16-1.pdf.
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common front with China against Washington’s trade tariffs. 3 Perhaps it is
time for the European Union and China to build on the existing EU-China
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, quickly conclude on-going
negotiations on their EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”), and
initiate and expedite formal substantive negotiations on an EU-China FTA.
China is now the European Union's second-biggest trading partner behind
the United States, and the European Union is China's biggest trading partner.
The resulting FTA could enhance trade opportunities and contribute to
China’s employment opportunities and rising labor standards. 4
There are recent precedents indicating China is open to substantive
labor provisions in its FTAs and these provisions will not be an obstacle to
completing an EU-China FTA.
After four years of negotiations, Switzerland has become the
second European country [and first with labor provisions] to
sign a free trade agreement with China. The importance of the
FTA rests in the fact that China regards it as a significant trial
run for further FTAs with industrialized countries and the
European Union. . . . Right from the start, the Nongovernmental Organizations and the trade unions successfully
committed the Swiss negotiating party to the inclusion of a
“durability chapter” in this FTA, which emphasizes human
rights and labor rights as well as environmental standards. 5
China is striving to become the leader in globalism 6 and is investing
heavily in making it happen. One of the world’s largest projects, the Belt and

3
Lucy Hornby, Tusk Calls for WTO Reform: Europe Seeks Common Front with China Against
Tariff Threat, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/e683392c-88b8-11e8-bf9e8771d5404543.
4
James Harrison et al., Governing Labor Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of the
European Union's Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters, 57 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 260, 262
(2019), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12715 (studying “EU bilateral trade
agreements in force prior to 2010, [and] concluding that those ‘with labor provisions have a positive and
statistically significant impact on workers’ rights in signatory nations.’”).
5
Vasco Pedrina & Zoltan Doka, Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement and Labor Rights,
GLOBAL LABOUR COLUMN (Oct. 2014), http://column.global-labour-university.org/2014/10/switzerlandchina-free-trade-agreement.html (footnote omitted).
6
See Ronald C. Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements? Chinese Style Global
Trade: New Rules, No Labor Protections, 35 PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 5 (2017).
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Road Initiative (“BRI”), 7 is a primary driver of China's development
strategy. A key aim of the BRI is to promote economic connectivity among
countries in Eurasia by recreating the historic Silk Road by land and sea
routes along several corridors. The land corridors include “roads, railways,
bridges, power plants—anything that makes it easier for Europe, Asia, and
Africa to trade goods with China.”8 The BRI’s sea route is “a chain of
seaports from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean that direct maritime
trade to and from China.”9
While the parts of the project fit like a giant jigsaw puzzle, one of the
most important corridors is the road between the EU and China—which has
aided China as the European Union's biggest source of imports and secondbiggest export market. 10
While China's Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(“RCEP”) and the European Union's Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (“TTIP”) languish, other FTAs around China, such as the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

7

Full Text: Action Plan on The Belt and Road Initiative, STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA,
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/
publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm [https://perma.cc/N657-4LXP]. China’s State
Council labels its “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiatives” as the
Belt and Road Initiative. It is explained as follows: “The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia,
Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European
economic circle at the other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic development.
The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the
Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West
Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the
Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the
other.” Id. See also Xi Jinping, President of People’s Republic of China, Work Together to Build the Silk
Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (May 14, 2017), in Full Text of President
Xi's Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum, XINHUA (May 14, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm.
8
Sam Ellis, China’s Trillion-Dollar Plan to Dominate Global Trade, VOX (April 6, 2018, 2:45
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/17206230/china-trade-belt-road-economy (including a video visually
describing the BRI. A negative aspect of China’s development can occur where China’s loans to finance
the roads, e.g., in Sri Lanka, cannot be repaid, and China assumes control over property and key ports in the
affected country).
9
Id.
10
Countries
and
Regions:
China,
EUROPEAN
COMM’N
(Aug.
2,
2019),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ (China and Europe trade on average
over €1 billion a day).
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(“CPTPP”) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(“CETA”), have grown. China’s most significant step toward its own
bilateral or eventual mega-regional FTA might be an EU-China BIT and FTA
setting its own standards among the EU’s 28 countries and China, which
would pave the Silk Road with a model for the other five corridors and the
68 countries touched by the BRI encompassing about two-thirds of the
world's population and account for more than 40% of global GDP. 11
Though there are many trade-related issues to resolve in the
negotiation of any FTA, this article focuses on the obstacles surrounding the
insertion of labor standards and their dispute resolution. Comparing
provisions in China and the European Union’s existing FTAs and BITs in the
context of the parties’ current global obligations, including to the
International Labour Organization (“ILO”), WBO, and Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), this article questions
whether labor provisions in BITs or FTAs will be an obstacle to reaching a
final FTA. Following the Introduction, Part II discusses the economic
opportunities and obstacles of an EU-China BIT and FTA and the status of
the parties’ current trade agreements. Part III compares the parties’
respective approaches on labor standards and dispute resolution in FTAs and
BITs. Part IV provides analyses on the comparisons of approaches, the
possible influence of recent FTAs, and the possible labor provisions needing
accommodation within international standards. Finally, Part V concludes that
labor-standards provisions should not be an obstacle and suggests that the
EU-China corridor of the new Silk Road could, and should, be paved with
standards consistent with international labor standards and emanating from
an EU-China FTA.
II.

NON-LEGAL

A.

Opportunities and Obstacles for Growth and Elevated Standards

The BRI is made up of six corridors that direct trade to and from
China, and one of the most significant corridors is between China and the

11

Charlie Campbell, China Says It's Building the New Silk Road. Here Are Five Things to Know
Ahead of a Key Summit, TIME (May 12, 2017), http://time.com/4776845/china-xi-jinping-belt-roadinitiative-obor/.
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European Union.12 The BRI offers the opportunity of complementary
benefits for the European Union and China. “The EU has the potential to
become the western ‘anchor’ of the BRI.”13
As free traders in Washington like to point out, it matters who
will write the rules or commerce in the 21st century. If the
United States isn’t interested anymore, why shouldn’t the EU
shoulder this responsibility? An EU-China free trade agreement
might not include everything the [Trans-Pacific Partnership]14
includes—there was a reason why China was never part of the
TPP negotiations. But the EU could raise trade standards by
asking China to put its money where its mouth is: the rhetoric
coming out of Beijing in the past year has been vigorously
globalist and pro-free trade. If Beijing wants to prove this isn’t
just rhetoric, a free-trade agreement with Brussels holds the
key. In return, China would receive greater access to the market
of its largest trading partner and European recognition of its
market economy status, which neither the EU nor the United
States currently recognizes. This would entail compromise from
Chinese leaders, but it would also bring benefits and these
concessions would be made to the EU, not to China’s potential
economic and strategic competitor, the United States. 15
Even with the growing economic integration of the European Union
and China there is still much room for growth, especially through foreign

12

Jonathan E. Hillman, The Rise of China-Europe Railways, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-china-europe-railways (“Just 10 years ago, regular direct
freight services from China to Europe did not exist. Today, they connect roughly 35 Chinese cities with 34
European cities. Rail services are considerably cheaper than air and faster than sea . . . and could provide a
compelling middle option for more goods in the coming years. Rail’s share of cargo by value is already
growing, increasing 144 percent during the first half of 2017, as compared to the same period in 2016. A
study commissioned by the International Union of Railways estimates that China-Europe rail services could
double their share of trade by volume over the next decade.”).
13
García-Herrero et al., supra note 2, at viii–ix.
14
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) was an FTA between twelve Asia-Pacific countries that
contained strong labor provisions. Before the United States withdrew in 2017, the TPP was set to become
the world’s largest free trade deal, covering 40 percent of the global economy. See James McBride &
Andrew Chatzky, What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 4,
2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp.
15
Andrei Lungu, A New G2: China and the EU?, THE DIPLOMAT (August 17, 2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/a-new-g2-china-and-the-eu/.
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direct investment (“FDI”) and services. 16 “Both EU and Chinese leaders
believe that effective rules-based multilateralism should form the core of
global governance.” 17
The [European Union] and China have much in common. Their
GDPs (€14.72 [$16.23] [CP1] trillion [rb2] and €9.75 [$10.75]
trillion, respectively, in 2015) rank number two and number
three in the world, behind the United States (€16.64 trillion).
They are two of the most externally-integrated economies in the
world, with annual international trade in goods and services of
€15 trillion [$16.54 trillion] (€5 trillion [$5.51 trillion] if only
trade external to the EU is considered) and €4.75 trillion [$5.24
trillion], respectively, in 2015. Their annual bilateral trade in
goods and services stood at €580 [$640] billion in 2015, with
each being the other’s largest source of imports and secondlargest export destination. . . . [M]any areas of economic
interaction remain under-developed, including trade in services,
levels of foreign investment, cooperation on industrial and
technological innovation, and financial market integration.18
Cogent reasons exist for an EU-China FTA: 19 1) the expanding trade
potential; 20 2) the growing and encroaching number of FTAs already setting
the rules of trade (such as the CPTPP and CETA—with the RCEP and TTIP
to follow) and the fact that the EU and China each have FTAs with some of

16

See Countries and Regions: China, supra note 10.
García-Herrero et al., supra note 2, at vi.
18
Id. (“Chinese imports of services grew at an average annual rate of more than 25 per cent between
2010 and 2015, and the EU’s trade surplus in services with China has been growing at an average annual
rate of 37 per cent since 2010, reaching €11 billion in 2015. . . . Growing Chinese consumption, especially
of services, has the potential to create new markets for European businesses, while rising Chinese
investment in the EU, in addition to increasing EU GDP and employment, also provides Chinese
companies with a platform to improve their global competitiveness”).
19
JACQUES PELKMANS ET AL., CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING
AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1–4 (2018) (outlining five arguments for an EU-China FTA:
“greater economic potential, comparative market access, mega-regionals, the link between Chinese reforms
and exposure to foreign competition, and strategic and geo-political advantages.”).
20
Id. at 1 (providing 2014 EU-China economic and trade indicators, including: (1) GDP: €16,556.9
billion for the EU and €9,014.7 billion for China; (2) GDP per capita: €32,307.7 for the EU and €6,468.2
for China; (3) total bilateral trade in goods and services: €518.8 billion; (4) FDI-EU position with China
(2013): outward €130 billion, inward €27 billion; (5) average applied tariffs in industry: 3.8% for the EU
and 8% for China; and, (6) average applied tariffs in agro-food: 7.2% for the EU and 13.9% for China).
17
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the same countries, e.g., South Korea; 21 3) China’s continual economic
reforms can adjust to the necessary accommodations for an FTA; 22 and, 4)
the coming EU-China corridor of the BRI portends the need for some
certainty in the EU-twenty-eight “rules of the road” in trade, including the
related issues of labor standards.23
Even with such cogent reasons for an FTA, many other practical
trade-related issues need to be addressed, such as differences in systems
(e.g., legal 24 and political) and standards (e.g., labor), and consistency in law
enforcement, not to mention substantive issues of intellectual property,
industry topics, etc. Additional obstacles stem from China’s reportedly nontransparent, exclusionary, and preferential trade practices.25 Prior EU-China
disputes highlight areas that negotiators would need to address.26
In 2016, due to China’s trading practices on dumping, the EU
Parliament members voted against the granting of market economy status
(“MES”) to China. 27 An alliance of thirty European industrial associations,

21

See Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 8–12. See also
Korea - Trade Agreements, EXPORT.GOV (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.export.gov/article?id=Korea-TradeAgreements.
22
PELKMANS ET AL., supra note 19, at 2–3 (“The fundamental connection is the drive to stimulate
productivity growth over a long period of time, after the current model of mass production based on lowskilled assembly and extreme export-led growth in such products has begun to run out of steam. Higher
productivity growth trends also require better, more and higher-quality services, both domestically and as
crucial elements in global value chains. Opening up the Chinese economy is therefore, in the mutual
interest of both the EU and China, and a deep partnership in the form of an ambitious FTA seems the most
expeditious way to achieve that aim.”).
23
See generally Mingha Zhao, The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for China-Europe
Relations, 51 THE INT’L SPECTATOR 109, 109–18 (2016).
24
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 94 (2017) (noting key areas that differ between the U.S. and China, including,
“administrative licensing, competition policy, the treatment of [NGOs], commercial dispute resolution,
labor laws and laws governing land use. Corruption among Chinese government officials, enabled in part
by China’s incomplete adoption of the rule of law, is also a key concern.”).
25
See Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 17–21.
26
See, e.g., Viktoria Dendrinou, EU Files Complaint Versus China on Raw-Material Duties,
MARKETWATCH (July 19, 2016, 8:07 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/eu-files-complaint-vschina-on-raw-material-duties-2016-07-19. See also EU Imposes Anti-Dumping Duties on Chinese Steel
Products, XINHUA (October 8, 2016, 10:20 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201610/08/content_26988038.htm.
27
MEPs Vote Against Market Economy Status for China, EU BUSINESS (May 13, 2016),
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/china-mes.121ag (“In a non-legislative resolution passed by 546 votes
to 28, [the EU Parliament] said that until China fulfils the EU's five criteria for market economy status, its
exports to the EU must be treated in a ‘non-standard’ way.”). See also What's Market Economy Status?,
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AEGIS Europe, said the European Parliament’s signal could not be clearer:
“a fair partnership is only possible if China plays by the rules of free and fair
international trade, and honors its WTO obligations.” 28
Another significant issue is the European Union’s domestic political
situation. Of the EU’s twenty-eight states, those already with “good trade
deals” with China will be hesitant to support an EU substitute FTA (even
though the EU may have the legal authority sign one under the Lisbon
Treaty). Divergences among Member States’ interests are especially
significant in the forging of the European Union’s coherent external
strategy, 29 and tensions between the European Union and its individual
member states weaken the European Union’s overall influence. In EU-China
relations, these inconsistencies can be exploited.
Member States will not easily be convinced to alter their
relationships with China; their lack of motivation thus far
proves as much. The relationships between the Member States
and China are almost entirely economic in nature, therefore
only unambiguous economic incentives can coax the EU out of
its current highly nationalized approach to China. A
comprehensive EU-China FTA would offer these crucial
incentives.30

MANUFACTURERS FOR TRADE ENFORCEMENT (2016), http://www.tradeenforcement.org/market-economystatus/ (“A ‘non-market economy’ is any foreign country that the U.S. Department of Commerce
determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures. When this is the case, sales
by the exporting country do not reflect fair value . . . .”); Why Doesn't China Qualify?, MANUFACTURERS
FOR TRADE ENFORCEMENT (2016), http://www.tradeenforcement.org/why-china-doesnt-qualify/ (“China is
still a Non-Market Economy. While China has made a number of economic reforms in recent years, the
Chinese economy remains fundamentally a non-market economic system dominated by the Communist
Party and the state.”).
28
Nick Prag, MEPs Defend EU Industry Against China's Unfair Trade Practices, EU BUSINESS
(May 12, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://www.eubusiness.com/Members/nickprag/china-trade-mes/.
29
See generally Jing Men, The EU and China: Mismatched Partners?, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA
333, 336 (2012).
30
Zachary Haver, Rebalancing EU-China Relations: The Case for an EU-China FTA, WORLD
ECON., TRADE AND FIN. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/02/2017/rebalancingeu-china-relations-case-eu-china-fta (“In general terms, given the enormous size of the EU-China economic
relationship, any additional trade liberalization, especially reduction in non-tariff barriers, stands to benefit
both parties. … In negotiating as a supranational bloc, the EU-28 would have a greater degree of leverage
to win concessions, and in turn would be able to collectively offer concessions of their own to China.”). See
also Michael Smith, EU Diplomacy and the EU–China Strategic Relationship: Framing, Negotiation and
Management, 29 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 78, 80–82 (2016); Lucie Qian Xia, So Far, So Close?
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Another political-legal issue raised by an EU-China BIT is what will be the
legal effect on the Member States’ BITs with China?
EU member states have since 1959 concluded 1,384 BITs with
third countries. Regulation 1219/2012 foresees that in the long
run all member state BITs are to be replaced by EU
[International Investment Agreements] [(“IIAs”)] but does not
set a specific time frame. The current EU negotiating agenda
will replace a part of existing member states’ BITs. . . .
However, the ultimate replacement of all existing member
states BITs with EU agreements will take time, and the high
number of authorizations granted shows that member states
remain active in negotiating BITs. . . . For all of these reasons, it
can be expected that individual EU member states will continue
to request to negotiate new treaties with third countries. 31
It is reported that “Germany has practically stopped negotiating new
BITs because of the transfer of competency for FDI to the level of the
European Union.”32 More recently, the European Union’s highest court, the

EU-China Network Diplomacy, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 17, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/so-far-soclose-eu-china-network-diplomacy/.
31
Stefanie Schacherer, Can EU Member States Still Negotiate BITs with Third Countries?, INT’L
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/can-eu-member-statesstill-negotiate-bits-with-third-countries-stefanie-schacherer/ (“Since the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty in 2009, foreign direct investment (FDI) falls within the common commercial policy of the
European Union and, as such, became part of the sphere of exclusive competence of the European Union.
The competence shift is evidenced by the negotiations of international investment agreements (IIAs) that
the European Commission is conducting with a number of countries, including important economies, such
as China and the United States. Against this background, third countries may be surprised when invited by
individual EU member states to start bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations. Does EU law allow
member states to initiate BIT negotiations? Only the European Union may legislate and adopt legally
binding acts concerning areas within its exclusive competence. EU member states may only do so
themselves if empowered by the European Union. Accordingly, it falls to the European Union to decide
whether to empower member states to conclude international treaties in fields of exclusive EU competence.
This ‘re-empowerment’ is usually adopted through secondary EU law (for example, EU regulations) and is
often used to provide for transitional arrangements concerning areas over which the European Union newly
acquired exclusive competence.”).
32
Axel Berger, Investment Treaties and the Search for Market Access in China, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 26, 2013), at n.1, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/06/26/investment-treaties-andthe-search-for-market-access-in-china/ (“As new European investment treaties will replace existing
member state BITs the number of German BITs will even decrease in the years to come.”). Once it enters
into force, the new agreement will streamline the existing BITs between China and 27 of the 28 EU
member states (all, except Ireland). Chancellor Merkel recently stated her support of an EU-China BIT. See
China, Germany Agree to Speed Up Talks on China-EU Investment Agreement, Enrich Bilateral Ties,

DECEMBER 2019

CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA

71

European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), struck down an arbitration agreement
contained within a BIT between two EU Member States, the Netherlands
and Slovakia, holding it was inconsistent with EU law. 33 Therefore, it is
apparent the EU-China BIT will eventually displace the twenty-six existing
bilateral agreements between China and EU Members. 34
Typical socio-economic issues are how FDI is used and the interaction
between foreign owners and local workers. Chinese FDI and ownership in
the European Union has raised concerns in some cases; 35 however, there are
also positive results, as illustrated by Chinese FDI in Sweden (an EU
Member State). Chinese investment has thus far been well received in
Sweden, where government, business, labor and interest groups, and even
the media have lauded Chinese investments for job creation and an increase
in the production of Swedish goods and services.36

XINHUA (June 2, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/02/c_136332689.htm (“Merkel said
Germany attaches great attention to the EU-China investment treaty, adding that the signing of the treaty
will be a good start of negotiations on an EU-China free trade agreement.”).
33
See Ben J. Williams, European Court of Justice Rules that Arbitration Agreement in Intra-EU
Bilateral Investment Treaty Violates EU Law Calling into Question the Arbitrability of Energy Disputes
Between EU Member States, KING & SPALDING LLP (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.kslaw.com/blogposts/european-court-of-justice-rules-that-arbitration-agreement-in-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treatyviolates-eu-law-calling-into-question-the-arbitrability-of-energy-disputes-between-eu-member-states
(noting that the ramifications of this judicial decision are uncertain but likely to impact not only intra-EU
BITs but also multilateral investment treaties involving the EU and its member states).
34
China-EU, BILATERALS.ORG (July 2014), https://www.bilaterals.org/?-china-eu-. See also
Schacherer, supra note 31 (“Only the European Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts
concerning areas within its exclusive competence. EU member states may only do so themselves if
empowered by the European Union. Accordingly, it falls to the European Union to decide whether to
empower member states to conclude international treaties in fields of exclusive EU competence. This ‘reempowerment’ is usually adopted through secondary EU law (for example, EU regulations) and is often
used to provide for transitional arrangements concerning areas over which the European Union newly
acquired exclusive competence.”); FAQ on the EU Competences and the European Commission Powers,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq (last updated Oct. 30,
2019).
35
See Factbox: Chinese Investments in German Companies, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-daimler-geely-factbox/factbox-chinese-investments-in-germancompanies-idUSKCN1GA1RO.
36
EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA (ETNC), CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE: A
COUNTRY LEVEL APPROACH, 154–55 (John Seaman et al. eds., 2017) (“According to China’s ambassador
to Sweden, Chen Yuming, investment in advanced manufacturing and technology can be linked to the
‘Made in China 2025’ initiative. Sweden can offer products, know-how, technology and innovation in areas
that constitute challenges for China, such as the environment and sustainable development. Here, the main
interests of Chinese investment in Sweden correspond to investment in Western Europe, with advanced
technology and established brands being the main interests of investment.”).
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China’s interaction with European workers and labor unions is quickly
increasing in scale, and by many accounts appears positive. By the end of
2016 in Italy, “more than 260 Chinese industrial and financial companies
had invested in around 450 Italian businesses, which in total employ more
than 25,000 workers.” 37 In Norway, 38 national labor union representatives
and some politicians initially resisted China Bluestar’s (a.k.a., ChemChina)
acquisition of Elkem (a Norwegian silicone producer). Those resisting
worried that a Chinese company, based in an authoritarian political system,
would not respect the rights of Norwegian laborers. Yet, since the takeover
was completed in 2011, Elkem’s representatives have appeared on television
regularly praising the company’s new owners.39
B.

Pathway Agreements and Projects

The clearest pathway to a successful bilateral FTA would build on the
existing EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation that places an
EU-China BIT 40 as central to the European Union’s long-term bilateral
relations with China. 41 The BIT would accelerate the process toward an FTA
and create a more open and transparent environment for increased flows of
investment. It would also improve investment for European and Chinese

37

Id. at 84.
See
Norway-European
Union
Relations,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norway%E2%80%93European_Union_relations (last visited Dec. 1, 2019);
(July
29,
2015),
Konstruktionstraktorer,
Grävmaskin
Bulldozer,
BLOGSPOT
http://gravmaskinbulldozer.blogspot.com/2015/07/norway-eu.html
[https://perma.cc/82N6-CRJE]
(“Although the Kingdom of Norway is not a member state of the European Union (EU), it is closely
associated with the Union through its membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), by virtue of
being a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), one of the historically two
dominant western European” associations).
39
EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA, supra note 36, at 105.
40
See Berger, supra note 32 (the EU-China BIT has also been referred to as the Comprehensive
Agreement on Investment (“CAI”) and the terms appear to have flexibility as the latter may omit some
terms present in a BIT). For example, China has also negotiated preferential trade investment agreements
(“PTIA”), of which four (with Pakistan, New Zealand, Peru, and ASEAN) included comprehensive rules
on investment. The PTIA with Singapore incorporates the China-ASEAN investment agreement and the
PTIA with Costa Rica (2010) reaffirms a previously-signed China-Costa Rica BIT (2007). The PTIA
recently signed with Iceland follows this approach and recognizes the importance (Art. 92) of the ChinaIceland BIT from 1994). See Iuliu Winkler, EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (EUChina CAI), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Oct. 20, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislativetrain/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-china-investmentagreement.
41
See EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, EUROPEAN UNION (Nov. 23, 2013),
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf.
38
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investors by creating investment rights and guaranteeing non-discrimination,
improving transparency, and providing investment rules on environmentaland labor-related aspects of foreign investment, as all are potential obstacles
to agreement of an FTA. 42
As the BIT will likely replace existing bilateral agreements between
China and EU member states, the groundwork for an eventual EU-China
FTA will already exist and could be integrated as was done in CETA and in
the EU-Vietnam FTA. 43 In 2013, the European Union carried out a
“Sustainability Impact Assessment” to assess the potential economic, social,
environmental, and human rights impact of the BIT agreement and, among a
number of conclusions, determined that forward FDI from the European
Union into China has a positive impact on employment and labor conditions
in China.44
In 2014, China, supported by the European Union, joined the U.S.-led,
on-going negotiations towards a global Trade in Services Agreement
(“TiSA”) that seeks to open markets and improve rules. 45
The [TiSA] is a trade agreement currently being negotiated by
23 members of the [WTO], including the EU. Together, the
participating countries account for 70% of world trade in
services. TiSA is based on the WTO's General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), which involves all WTO members.
The key provisions of the GATS—scope, definitions, market
access, national treatment and exemptions—are also found in
TiSA. TiSA aims at opening markets and improving rules in
areas such as licensing, financial services, telecoms, ecommerce, maritime transport, and professionals moving
abroad temporarily to provide services. There is no formally set
deadline for ending the negotiations.46

42

Id.. See also Countries and Regions: China, supra note 10.
PELKMANS ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
44
See Impact Assessment Report on the EU-China Investment Relations, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(May
23,
2013),
at
45–46,
http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2013/swd_2013_0185_en.pdf.
45
Trade in Services Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/
(last updated July 14, 2017). See also Donnan & Byrne, supra note 1.
46
Trade in Services Agreement, supra note 45; see also Donnan & Byrne, supra note 1. See also
Berger, supra note 32, at n. 7; THE WORLD BANK, CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND
43
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And, there is a working group from high levels of both governments,
underscoring the seriousness of the work; the EU-China Trade Project II
(“EUCTP II”), works on the many substantive issues of an EU-China FTA
and suggests appropriate positions and accommodations to support China's
continued integration into the global trading system. 47 EUCTP II will hold
approximately 400 individual activities, organized under five linked
components covering 40 technical files: (1) trade in services; (2) quality
infrastructure and technical barriers to trade; (3) agriculture and SPS; (4)
customs and trade related regulatory systems; and, (5) cross-cutting
policies.48 This is the third project since 2000 that seeks to create a more
open EU-China pathway. However, this program expands on previous
attempts by promoting fair competition and value for consumers; facilitating
harmonization with international standards and promoting safe products;
improving food safety and quality; modernizing customs; and encouraging a
more transparent legal environment with work towards transparency, good
governance, and sustainable development. 49
C.

EU and Chinese Labor Standards and Dispute Resolution

To the surprise of many, a recent study suggests that there may not be
so many differences between Chinese labor standards of workers and those
of some EU States.50 A study of Foxconn in the Czech Republic shows that
the practices of using temporary workers, maintaining low labor costs, and
restricting trade unions resemble Chinese practices. 51 Of course, this is a

CREATIVE SOCIETY 389 (2013) (The report “China 2030” published by the World Bank together with the
Development Research Center of the State Council, one of the most influential Chinese think tanks on
economic policy issues, calls for a further liberalization of investment restrictions, and especially highlights
the importance of market access provisions to be included in future Chinese investment treaties).
47
See Carl Hayward, Trading Places: The EU-China Trade Project, EUROBIZ (May 30, 2014),
https://www.eurobiz.com.cn/trading-places-eu-china-trade-project.
48
See
Project
Overview,
EU-China
Trade
Project
II,
EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/china/documents/news/20110324_01_en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 1, 2019); Hayward, supra note 47. See also GARCÍA-HERRERO ET AL., supra note 2, at 59–67.
49
See Project Overview, EU-China Trade Project II, supra note 48.
50
Rutvica Andrijasevic, Made Within/Outside the EU: What’s the Difference?, UNI. LEICESTER SCH.
OF BUS. BLOG (June 11, 2014), https://staffblogs.le.ac.uk/management/2014/06/11/made-withinoutside-theeu-whats-the-difference/.
51
See id. (In 2015, “in the Czech Republic, the firm achieves flexibility by employing 40 percent of
its workforce through temporary work agencies. These indirectly employed laborers—primarily EU
migrants from Slovakia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria—work 12-hour shifts during the peak production
periods and are transported back to their countries of origin when work is scarce. They are hired on shortterm contracts and are given notice of their shifts a week in advance at best, but often learn if they have
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mere snapshot and there is a much larger picture of employment profiles and
legal standards and approaches regulating labor that show wide gulfs within
the EU Member States and between EU Member States and China.52 A
recent publication finds that electronics firms in Eastern European countries
often use employment practices resembling those in mainland China—a socalled “China-isation” of labor conditions in some EU Member States.53
This evolution of Chinese investment in Eastern Europe has had an impact
on working rights and conditions of European workers employed in the
electronics sector, especially in Eastern Europe.
Beijing was beginning to pour money and political capital into
Eastern and Central Europe as part of a broad bid to increase its
heft in Europe. China’s leaders see the region as potentially
fertile ground. . . . Looking for further inroads, China started
what came to be called the 16+1 initiative, an effort to expand
cooperation with more than a dozen Eastern and Central
European nations. It became a forum for China to show off
what it could offer the region, like access to technology for a
high-speed rail system. Mr. Xi later included Eastern and
Central Europe in his Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious
plan to develop economic and diplomatic ties through
infrastructure projects around the world.54

work on the same day. Furthermore, they are paid €2-2.5 per hour compared to directly employed workers
who are paid €3-3.5 per hour . . . . In the Czech Republic, where trade unions are plant-based, the union
tends to only be concerned with issues concerning directly employed workers, the majority of whom are
Czech nationals. This de facto exclusion is done to protect the interests of the domestic workers, who
benefit from the presence of temporary EU migrants because the latter group absorbs fluctuations in the
demand for labor.”).
52
See Agnès Parent-Thirion, et al., Eurofound, Sixth European Working Conditions Survey (2017);
see also John Hurley, et al., Eurofound & European Comm’n Joint Research Ctr., European Jobs Monitor
2019: Shifts in the Employment Structure at Regional Level (2019).
53
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), China-isation of Working Conditions and Workers’
Rights in Europe, MEDIUM (Oct. 7, 2016), https://medium.com/@ETUI_org/eletronicsineuropef413df96297b (listing comprehensive comparative wages and benefits for workers in the electronics
industries in Hungary, Czechia, and Turkey, working for Foxconn, Flextronics, Nokia, and Samsung; they
are all similarly low).
54
David Barboza et. al., China Seeks Influence in Europe, One Business Deal at a Time, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2MmEm9w. The 16+1 format is an initiative by the People’s Republic of
China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU member states and 5 Balkan countries:
Albania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See “16+1” Summit
Has Concluded, COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
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Notwithstanding the above regional wage disparities, the general
wage gap between Chinese and European workforces in recent years has
narrowed and diminished the competitive cost advantage that China has
enjoyed in the past. To better compete, China seeks to mitigate losing its
competitive edge due to its rising wages by developing automation and using
robots in many economic sectors under its Made in China 2025
robotization/digitalization initiative.55 Still, in 2017, the following was
reported:
China’s median net salary is now equal to parts of Europe, and
higher than some Eastern European countries, due to its new
minimum wage standards. Factory workers in China are earning
more than ever as average hourly wages have gone up a
significant 64% since 2011. The trend is expected to continue as
salaries for both blue and white-collar workers are expected to
grow by 7% this year alone. Wage increases are beneficial for
Chinese workers as they rise to the level of various European
countries. Median wages in Shanghai ($1,135) are now
comparable to Hungary ($1,139), Prague ($1,400) and Poland
($1,569). Yet China’s status as a global manufacturing hub—
due in most part to its cheap labor—will likely be impacted.
The improved wages for workers may result in a loss of the

(Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ldrhw_1/2016lj/hdxw4/t1414327.htm. Moreover, the
China-Europe express railway route has become a key channel of land transportation in the global logistics
market and is an important link between China and CEEC. See also “16+1” Mechanism Set to Bolster
China-Europe Ties, COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
(Jul. 10, 2018) http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz_1/t1575579.htm. Guided by previous China-CEEC
summits, the 16+1 mechanism has developed into an important channel for trans-regional cooperation and
an eye-catching platform of open multilateral cooperation, which is widely seen as conducive to
collaboration between China and the EU. In recent years, there has been steady growth in economic
cooperation and trade between China and CEE countries, with two-way trade reaching $67.98 billion in
2017, up 15.9 percent from the previous year, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Premier Li
also said China expects to strive for pragmatic results in advancing China-EU bilateral investment treaty
(“BIT”) negotiations and dealing with climate change so as to jointly uphold multilateralism, promote
liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment and safeguard world peace, stability and
development. Id.
55
See Ronald C. Brown, Made in China 2025: Implications of Robotization and Digitalization on
MNC Labor Supply Chains and Workers’ Labor Rights in China, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 186, 186
(2017).
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country’s competitive edge to labor pools in Eastern Europe and
other Asian countries.56
The parity and diversity between the European Union and China
suggest there is common ground to discuss FTA rules affecting labor issues.
It also reinforces the need to understand the diversity of labor standards in
China and within the EU Member States.
Labor unions of course have much interest in international trade not
undermining labor rights and opportunities. In 2013, Switzerland became
the first European economy (though not an EU Member) to sign an FTA
with China, which contained labor provisions and demonstrates China is
open to including such terms. 57 It is reported that interesting political
controversy accompanied the negotiation process in that the “Swiss Business
Federation and the ‘political right’ were [anxious] to secure privileged
access to the massive Chinese market ahead of all the competitors in the EU
countries” 58 and advocated disregarding human and labor rights to obtain
that competitive edge. 59 Ultimately, though the final agreement contains a
weak monitoring system with no penalties the “political right” lost the
argument to exclude labor standard protections.60 There was sentiment that
the labor provision did not go far enough and only delivered a glass “halfempty[.]” 61 However, while Swiss labor unions initially opposed the weak
labor standards, they later reversed their position and supported the FTA
(even though labor accommodations were lacking) when they determined
advantages were gained. Swiss trade unions decided that the official linkages
under the agreement to facilitate cooperation between unions in Switzerland

56
China’s Wages are Catching up to Europe, GLOBAL UPSIDE (Sept. 4, 2017),
http://www.globalupside.com/chinas-wages-are-catching-up-to-europe/ (“Over the last decade, the
European Union (EU) has taken steps to integrate this pool of cheap labor into the global workforce.
However, as the Eastern European and Chinese workforces compete, a low-wage ceiling has formed; these
two labor pools have come to determine the cost of low-skill labor worldwide. Despite Croatia becoming
the newest EU member, the median net salary in Shenzhen, Beijing and Shanghai are all higher than
Croatia.”).
57
Pedrina & Doka, supra note 5. Iceland followed as a second European state to sign an FTA with
China. See Europe FTAs, BILATERALS.ORG, https://www.bilaterals.org/?-europe-ftas (last updated May
2012) (Iceland is not an EU Member but is a member of EFTA).
58
Pedrina & Doka, supra note 5.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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and China, as well as the opportunity to educate the companies and workers
regarding labor standards, were worthy of their support.62 The unions
perceived the gains as follows:
[T]he preamble to the FTA cites the protocol of understanding
reached between Switzerland and China in 2007 on what is
termed a “human rights dialogue”. In addition, both sides
confirm their commitment to upholding the UN Charter, which
is the basis for the subsequently elaborated UN human rights
instruments. Regarding ILO core standards, both countries
commit to respecting those that have been ratified; China has
ratified only 4 (excluding the standards protecting freedom of
association and prohibiting forced labor). This is highly
problematic. However, the agreement does contain a reference
to both parties’ obligations arising from membership of the ILO
and from the major ILO declarations on labor rights and social
justice, observing all 8 core standards. 63
In further support of labor cooperation, a recent joint study on
Europe’s and China's future employment challenges by the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (“CASS”) and the Directorate General for
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European
Commission concluded there is a shared need to upgrade the labor skills of
existing workers. 64
It is also noteworthy that the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for
Cooperation, in its EU-China BIT negotiations, set a goal to negotiate “rules
on environmental and labor-related aspects of foreign investment.”65
Certainly issues of trade unions and workers’ organizational rights under the
ILO core labor standards will need to be addressed, along with decisions

62

Id.
Id.
64
See CAI FANG & XAVIER PRATS MONNÉ, EUROPEAN COMM’N, NEW SKILLS FOR NEW JOBS: CHINA
AND THE EU 25–26 (2012) (“Both China and the EU share a common aim to upskill the labor force and
recognize that the majority of those that need upskilling are already in work. It is a challenging task to
ensure that individuals have access to and actually take up training and that the relevant stakeholders
understand the need to provide accessible training to existing workers.”)
65
Countries and Regions: China, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
63
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made about including those rights in a Social Dimension provision in an EUChina FTA.66
III.

LEGAL: CURRENT LABOR OBLIGATIONS

This section will address the labor obligations, or lack thereof, China
and EU members have formed through BITs and FTAs.
A.

China

While Chinese BITs have not addressed labor concerns, several FTAs
with attached MOUs do, though the substance and enforcement are weak.
This section will outline and analyze the current labor standard agreements
China has made with other countries.
1.

BITs

Current China BITs, 67 generally, and specifically those with EU
Member States do not contain labor protections or references to ILO
standards.68 It is not uncommon for a BIT to precede an FTA, and BITs often
are incorporated into later FTAs. It was recently noted that as “a precursor to
their [FTA] negotiations, which launched in March 2013, China, Japan, and
Korea (“CJK”) signed a trilateral investment agreement in May 2012.” 69
The agreement aims to set the ground-work for greater
regulatory transparency, a more predicable policy environment,
and a liberalized investment regime in order to facilitate

66
INT’L LABOR ORG., SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 4 (rev. ed. 2015) (social
dimension provisions in FTAs include ILO labor standards).
67
See
UN
Investment
Policy
Hub:
Terminology,
INV.
POLICY
HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent#iiaInnerMenu
(click
on
drop-down
“Terminology+” in left-hand menu) (“International investment agreements (IIAs) are divided into two
types: (1) bilateral investment treaties and (2) treaties with investment provisions). A bilateral investment
treaty is an agreement between two countries regarding promotion and protection of investments made by
investors from respective countries in each other’s territory. The great majority of IIAs are BITs.
68
See Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 2019),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf; see also UN Investment Policy
Hub: Terminology, supra note 66.
69
Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino, The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement:
Implications for US Policy and the US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, TOWARD A US-CHINA
INVESTMENT TREATY 6, 6 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Economics 2015) (ebook).
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intraregional [FDI] (CJK Joint Study Committee 2011).70
German Chancellor Merkel recently stated her support of an
EU-China BIT; “Germany attaches great attention to the EUChina investment treaty, adding that the signing of the treaty
will be a good start of negotiations on an EU-China free trade
agreement.”71
The European Union, itself, has a number of BITs, none of which
include labor provisions (though, as discussed below, several EU members’
agreements include labor terms). As the European Union and Chinese trade
relationship continues to grow, it is also expected that FDI will increase for
both parties. This will result in greater interaction with workers and foreign
labor unions and increase the need for attention to labor issues and labor
union cooperation. 72 Meanwhile, the negotiations for an EU-China BIT
continue.73 It will replace the twenty-six existing Bilateral Investment
Treaties between the twenty-seven individual EU member states and China
with a single comprehensive investment agreement.74

70

See Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of
Investment, May 13, 2012, Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf. See also Significantly Enhanced
Protection for Korean Investors Achieved Through Amendment of Korean-China Investment Protection
and Promotion Agreement, S. KOR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (Apr. 13, 2007),
http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=296267&srchFr=&amp%3BsrchTo=&amp%3Bsrch
Word=&amp%3BsrchTp=&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_2=0&a
mp%3Bcompany_cd=&amp%3Bcompany_nm= [https://perma.cc/8SQ3-K7K4].
71
Talks on China-EU Investment Agreement to Speed Up, BILATERALS.ORG (June 2, 2017),
https://www.bilaterals.org/?talks-on-china-eu-investment.
72
EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA, supra note 36, at 154–55.
73
Overview of the FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, supra note 68 (the 18th round of negotiations
took place in Brussels on July 12–13, 2018).
74
Id. (In 2016 the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and
comprehensive scope for the EU-China investment agreement and established a joint negotiating text).
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One survey reveals that in mid-2015 “there were 13 [Chinese] FTAs,”
of which eight lack labor protection provisions (ASEAN, Asia-Pacific, Costa
Rica, Hong Kong, Macau, Pakistan, Singapore, and Taiwan) while five
include labor protection standards (Chile, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, and
Switzerland). 76 Of these latter five FTAs, substantive labor provisions can

75

See generally Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6. See also Jay
Chittooran, What Do Chinese Rules Mean for Worker Rights?, THIRD WAY (Apr. 14, 2015),
https://www.thirdway.org/report/what-do-chinese-rules-mean-for-worker-rights. (Arguably, there are 16
FTAs, as China had three other FTAs negotiated and in effect (with Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand) but
they have not yet been notified to the WTO. None of these three contain a Social Dimension provision with
labor protections); Free Trade Agreements (China), ASIAN REG’L INTEGRATION CTR.,
https://aric.adb.org/fta-country (the agreement with Taipei is an Economic Cooperation Agreement);
People's Republic of China-Taipei, China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, ASIAN REG’L
INTEGRATION
CTR.,
https://aric.adb.org/fta/peoples_republic_of_chinataipeichina_economic_cooperation_framework_agreement (signed and in effect, not yet notified to WTO);
People's Republic of China-Thailand Free Trade Agreement, ASIAN REG’L INTEGRATION CTR.,
https://aric.adb.org/fta/peoples-republic-of-china-thailand-free-trade-agreement (signed and in effect but
not yet notified to the WTO); People's Republic of China-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, ASIAN
REG’L INTEGRATION CTR., https://aric.adb.org/fta/peoples-republic-of-china-japan-korea-free-tradeagreement (signed and in effect but not yet notified to the WTO); Free Trade Agreement Between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea, June 1,
2015, China-S. Kor., Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea/annex/xdzw_en.pdf [hereinafter China-Korea FTA].
76
See China FTA Network, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enperu.shtml (many sections in Chinese only). The 13 agreements are: AsiaPacific Trade Agreement, Nov. 2, 2005, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/yatai/xieyiwenben_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y82T-9M2Y]; Mainland and Hong
Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (“CEPA”), June 29, 2003, China-H.K., Hong Kong
Special Admin. Region Trade and Indus. Dep’t, https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/files/main_e.pdf;
Mainland and Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, Dec. 18, 2014, China-Mac., Gov't of the
Mac.
Special
Admin.
Region
Econ.
Servs.,
https://www.economia.gov.mo/public/docs/CEPA_ACBLCS/index/en/main_text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QJB-G2F3]; Agreement On Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the People’s Republic Of China and the Association Of
Southeast Asian Nations, Jan. 14, 2007, China-ASEAN, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng/annex/xieyi2004en.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHG8-BQ951]; Free
Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Chile, Nov. 18, 2005, art. 108, China-Chile, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of
China,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/xieyi/freetradexieding2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9LR-ASZ2]
[hereinafter China-Chile FTA]; People's Republic of China-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 8,
2010,
China-Costa
Rica,
Sys.,
Org.
of
Am.
States
Foreign
Trade
Info.
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CRI_CHN_FTA/Texts_Apr2010_e/CRI_CHN_Core_text_en.pdf?bcsi_scan
_7823DFCE46415F3E=0&bcsi_scan_filename=CRI_CHN_Core_text_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JGD-
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only be found in the Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”), not in the
texts of the FTAs. These provisions’ levels of protection range widely. In the
China-Iceland FTA the parties agree to enhanced labor communication and
cooperation.77 In other agreements, such as those with New Zealand and
Switzerland, the parties reaffirm their obligations under the ILO, recognize
that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or
failing to enforce labor laws, and that it is inappropriate to set or use labor
laws, regulations, policies and practices for trade protectionist purposes
(though there is no enforcement mechanism). 78 Thus, in essence, the parties
agreed that they had ratified some ILO conventions and agreed to cooperate
and consult if they disagree on their respective implementations of
obligations. This type of provision is arguably comparable with the “soft
law” approaches of corporate social responsibility and codes of conduct,
where parties are under no enforceable legal obligations.79
b.

EU Member States
Currently, there are no FTAs between EU states and China.

4JAY]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of New Zealand, Apr. 7, 2008, China-N.Z., N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAsagreements-in-force/China-FTA/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf
[https://perma. cc/Q8JL-GBP6] [hereinafter China-New Zealand FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the People's Republic of China,
Nov.
24,
2006,
China-Pak.,
United
Nations
Conference
on
Trade
&
Dev.,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2738 [https://perma.cc/8MEX-D6V3]; Free
Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Singapore Trade Agreement, Oct. 28, 2008, China-Sing., Ministry of Commerce of the
People's Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensingapore.shtml [https://perma.cc/S6EP6SAQ]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the
Government of Peru, Apr. 28, 2009, art. 161, China-Peru, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic
of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf [https://perma. cc/X3PC-A244]; CrossStraits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, June 29, 2010, China-Taiwan, World Treaty Org.
Reg'l Trade Agreements Info. Sys., https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/ECFA.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6ZD-VLLB]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Government of Iceland, Apr. 15, 2013, art. 96, China-Ice., Ministry of Commerce of the
People's
Republic
of
China,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/iceland/xieyi/2013-4-17-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PY5F-35DA] [hereinafter China-Iceland FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the
People's Republic of China and the Swiss Confederation, July 6, 2013, China-Switz., Ministry of
Commerce of the People's Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enswiss.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2J4R-3YPC] [hereinafter China-Swiss FTA].
77
See China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76.
78
See, e.g., China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 76.
79
Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 14–17.
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c.

Non-EU-Member States80

i)

China-Switzerland FTA 81

83

The 2013 Switzerland-China FTA contains minimal language
regarding labor standards. Chapter 13.5, Economic and Technical
Cooperation, refers to the 2011 and the 2013 China-Swiss Memoranda of
Understanding on Labor.82 The labor provisions in the 2013 MOU are
summarized as follows:
1. Source of standards:
a. Parties reaffirm the obligations of China and Switzerland
as members of the ILO, including their commitments
under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. 83
b. Parties reaffirm the obligations Ministerial Declaration of
the UN Economic and Social Council on Full
Employment and Decent Work of 2006, to recognizing
full and productive employment and decent work for all
as a key element of sustainable development.84
c. The Parties reaffirm the ILO Declaration on Social
Justice for a Fair Globalization adopted by the
International Labor Conference at its 97th session in
2008. 85
2. Obligations:
a. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
trade or investment by weakening or reducing the

80
See Ronald C. Brown, Asian and U.S. Perspectives on Labor Rights under International Trade
Agreements Compared, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF LABOUR RIGHTS 83, 96–112 (Axel Marx, Jan
Wouters, Glenn Rayp & Laura Beke, eds., 2015) (discussing differences of approach in the use of labor
provisions by Asian countries and many developed western countries).
81
See China-Swiss FTA, supra note 76.
82
See Agreement on Labour and Employment Cooperation Between the Federal Department of
Economic Affairs, Education and Research of the Swiss Confederation and the Ministry Of Human
Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic Of China, July 6, 2013, Swiss-China,
ChinaGoAbroad Limited, http://files.chinagoabroad.com/Public/uploads/v2/uploaded/attachments/1402/
Agreement+on+Labour+and+Employment.pdf (the 2013 MOU also referenced an earlier more generallyworded 2011 MOU).
83
Id. art. 2(1).
84
Id. art. 2(2).
85
Id. art. 2(4).
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protections afforded in domestic labor laws, regulations,
policies and practices in China and Switzerland.86
b. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to set or use
domestic labor laws, regulations, policies and practices
for trade protectionist purposes.87
c. The Parties will effectively enforce their respective
domestic labor laws. 88
d. Article 3(2) of 2013 MOU refers to 2011 MOU
Cooperative activities that shall be conducted and may,
inter alia, be implemented through:
i. Dialogue, exchange of information and best
practices
ii. Meetings, visits, and workshops of experts
iii. Joint studies
iv. Joint initiatives in multilateral organizations
v. Cooperation projects and capacity building
e. Each Party shall appoint a coordinator as contact point
for implementation of the MOU 89
3. Dispute resolution
a. “Should any issue arise over the interpretation or
application of this Agreement, a Party may request
consultations with the other Party through the contact
points. The Parties will make every effort to reach
consensus on the matter through cooperation,
consultation and dialogue.”90
b. “This Agreement shall enter into force on the sixtieth day
upon the issue of the latter notification. It shall remain in
force indefinitely unless either Party gives notification of
termination to the other Party with six months’ notice.”91

86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. art. 2(5).
Id. art. 2(6).
Id. art. 2(7).
Id. art. 4(1).
Id. art. 4(2).
Id. art. 5.
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85

China-Iceland FTA 92

ii)

Iceland is not technically an EU Member though it does share many
common undertakings. 93 The 2013 Iceland-China FTA has no substantive
labor standards. The only reference to labor is found in Chapter 9, Article
96, Labor and Environment Cooperation, where the parties agree to enhance
communication and cooperation on labor matters. 94
“1. The Parties shall enhance their communication and cooperation on labor matters. 2. The Parties will further enhance
communication and co-operation in accordance with the
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Protection
Cooperation between the State Environmental Protection
Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the
Ministry for the Environment of Iceland.”95

92

See China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76.
See Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 3 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994). “The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force on 1
January 1994, brings together the EU Member States and the three EEA EFTA States — Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway — in a single market, referred to as the ‘Internal Market.’” EEA Agreement,
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA), https://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement (last visited Dec. 1,
2019). In March 2015 Iceland's government requested that “Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate
country for EU membership.” Iceland, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/iceland_en (last updated Nov. 22, 2017). The
Agreement includes close cooperation in areas such as research and development, education, social policy,
the environment, consumer protection, enterprise, tourism and culture. Iceland and the EU. EEA
Agreement, supra note 93.
94
China-Iceland FTA supra note 76.
95
Id. Regarding the MOU, a communication, dated 5 September 2016, was circulated at the request
of the delegations of Iceland and China. The communication included questions to the parties and their
answers, including one that read: “In 2005, China and Iceland have signed the Memorandum of
Understanding on Environmental Protection Cooperation (MOU). In the China and Iceland FTA, both
parties have reiterated the willingness to further promote communication and cooperation according the
MOU. All these actions have facilitated the personnel exchanges and information communication between
parties. China and Iceland are willing to promote the cooperation of labor and environment under the
China-Iceland FTA, especially in the area of nature resource protection, environmental industry and
technics, etc.” Free Trade Agreement Between Iceland and China (Goods and Services) Questions and
Replies,
TRADE
ORG.,
https://docsonline.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009WORLD
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=230995,229840,127699&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextH
ash= (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
93

86
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China-Chile FTA96

iii)

The labor provisions are contained in a 2005 MOU, which can be seen
to be somewhat strong in substantive obligations, but very weak in
enforcement.97
1. Source of standards: The Parties shall carry out mutually agreed
co-operation activities, more particularly in the following
fields:
a. employment and labor policies and social dialogue,
including decent work, labor laws and labor inspection;
b. improvement of working conditions and workers
training;
c. globalization and its impact on employment, the working
environment, industrial relations and governance, social
security. 98
2. Obligations: Co-operation between the Parties shall more
particularly be carried out by means of:
a. exchanges of information and expertise in the fields
covered by the Memorandum;
b. reciprocal visits of experts and delegations;
c. joint organization of seminars, workshops and meetings
for experts, regulatory authorities and other persons
concerned;
d. consultations within the framework of multilateral
discussions on employment, training, labor and social
security issues. 99

96

See China-Chile FTA, supra note 76 (“The Parties shall enhance their communication and
cooperation on labor, social security and environment through both the Memorandum of Understanding on
Labor and Social Security Cooperation, and the Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the
Parties.”).
97
Memorandum of Understanding on Labour and Social Security Cooperation between the Ministry
of Labour and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security of The Republic of Chile, Nov. 2, 2005, China-Chile, Org. of Am. States Foreign Trade Info. Sys.,
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CHL_CHN/Negotiations/MOU_e.pdf [hereinafter China-Chile MOU on
Labour and Social Security Cooperation].
98
Id. art. 1.
99
Id. art. 2.
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“Each of the Parties shall seek to secure the funds required to support
co-operation activities and shall undertake the co-ordination of the
departments responsible for the implementation of this Memorandum.” 100
3. Dispute Resolutions:
a. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect in any way the
rights and obligations of the Parties resulting from any
international legal instrument.101
China-New Zealand FTA 102

iv)

The labor provisions are contained in a 2008 MOU, which has good
substantive obligations but weak enforcement. 103
1. Source of Standards: “The Parties reaffirm their obligations as
members of the ILO, including their commitments under the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up.”104
2. Obligations:
a. “The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to set or
use their labor laws, regulations, policies and practices
for trade protectionist purposes.”105
b. “The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing
the protections afforded in domestic labor laws,
regulations, policies and practices.” 106
c. “Each Party may, as appropriate, invite the participation
of its unions and employers and/or other persons and

100

Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 5
102
China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 78, art. 177.
103
See Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation, 2008, N.Z.-China, N.Z. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs & Trade, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-force/China-FTA/NZChina-FTA-Labour-MOU.pdf [hereinafter N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation]. The factor of an
Asian country negotiating with a Western developed country is discussed in Brown, Asian and U.S.
Perspectives on Labor Rights Under International Trade Agreements Compare, in Protecting Labor Rights
in a Globalizing World, supra note 80, at 96–112.
104
N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation, art. 1(1).
105
Id. art. 1(3).
106
Id. art. 1(4).
101
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organizations of their countries in identifying potential
areas for cooperation and in undertaking cooperative
activities.”107
d. Each of the Parties shall seek to secure the funds required
to support cooperation activities and shall undertake the
coordination for the implementation of this
Memorandum of Understanding.108
3. Dispute Resolution:
a. “Should any issue arise over the interpretation or
application of this Memorandum of Understanding, a
Party may request consultation with the other Party,
through the coordinator. The Parties will make every
effort to reach a consensus on the matter through
cooperation, consultation and dialogue.”109
China-Peru FTA

v)

The labor provisions are contained in Article 161, Labor Cooperation,
of the 2009 MOU: “[t]he Parties shall enhance their communication and
cooperation on labor, social security and environment issues through
Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Cooperation between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Peru.”110
B.

The European Union

The European Union currently has no FTA or BIT with China, though,
as discussed above, it is negotiating with China for a BIT and planning for
an FTA. 111 The new EU-China BIT “will replace the 26 existing Bilateral
Investment Treaties between 27 individual EU Member States and China by

107

Id. art. 2(4).
Id. art. 3(3).
109
Id. art. 4(1).
110
See China-Chile FTA, supra note 76. The author was unable to locate a separate Labor
Cooperation MOU. See Trade Policy Developments: Peru-China, ORG. OF AM. STATES FOREIGN TRADE
INFO. SYS., http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/PER_CHN/PER_CHN_e.ASP (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). The
author was unable to locate a separate Labor Cooperation MOU for Peru-China.
111
See also Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, supra note 68, at 9 (the 18th round of
negotiations took place in Brussels from July 12–13, 2018).
108
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one single comprehensive investment Agreement.” 112 In addition to BITs
and FTAs, the European Union also negotiates treaties called Association
Agreements that can also contain commitments regarding labor protections,
as discussed below.
1.

Association Agreements

The European Union has more than twenty Association Agreements
(“AA”), 113 including with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. 114 An AA has
been defined as follows:
a treaty between the European Union and a non-EU country that
creates a framework for co-operation between them. Its legal
basis is defined in Article 217 of the Treaty of the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU), which provides for “an
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common
action and special procedures. 115
Under treaty powers, the European Union is authorized “to conclude
with one or more third countries or international organizations agreements
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations,
common action and special procedure.”116 Article 217 states they are

112

Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, supra note 68, at 10 (in 2016 the EU and China
negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and comprehensive scope for the EU-China
investment agreement and established a joint negotiating text).
113
See
Association
Agreements,
INST.
FOR
GOV’T
(Mar.
22,
2018),
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/association-agreements (“Association agreements
were originally created by the EU to prepare non-member countries for accession. The very first such
agreement was signed by Greece in 1961. But the EU has since used these agreements for far wider
reasons, from improving trade with non-member countries such as Morocco, to developing deeper, longterm political relations with countries who are not candidates for accession such as Ukraine.”).
114
See Association Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part,
and Ukraine, of the Other Part, Mar. 21, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 161) 3 [hereinafter EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement]; Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community and their Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia, of the Other Part, June 27, 2014, 2014
O.J. (L 261) 4 [hereinafter EU-Georgia Association Agreement]; Association Agreement Between the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the One Part,
and the Republic of Moldova, of the Other Part, June 27, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 260) 4 [hereinafter EUMoldova Association Agreement].
115
Association Agreements, supra note 113.
116
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 217, June 7,
2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 13.
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generally characterized by a number of principles, including “a clause on the
respect of human rights and democratic principles.” 117
These Association Agreements are relevant in that they have labor
standards and dispute settlement mechanisms consistent with EU FTAs. For
example, the EU-Ukraine AA states the parties shall promote the ILO core
labor standards, and implement ratified ILO conventions, shall not use labor
laws for protectionist purposes, or lower labor standards for trade advantage,
and shall enforce the labor laws. 118 The dispute settlement provisions are
like those of the EU FTAs in that they provide for consultation and use of a
panel of experts. 119
2.

BITs

Currently, the European Union does not have a BIT with China,120
though some EU members do (with labor provisions). It now appears the
European Union itself will have the lead in negotiating external BITs. 121 It
also appears the European Union is moving toward including “better
practices” 122 into its BITs, which arguably can include labor rights. 123 Since

117

Association Agreements, supra note 113.
See EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, supra note 114, art. 291(2-4).
119
See id. art. 300(7). See also EU-Georgia Association Agreement, supra note 114, art. 378(1); EUMoldova Association Agreement, supra note 114, art. 242(1).
120
The EU-China Investement Treaty, FED’N OF GERMAN INDUS. (BDI) (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://english.bdi.eu/article/news/the-eu-china-investment-treaty/.
121
See Peter Turner & Christian Nitsch, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, EU Reveals the Future
of BITs Between European States and the Rest of the World, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 10, 2013),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dac2e673-ce20-48c0-a589-2dd934ca190b (“When the
Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009, the European Union (EU) was granted exclusive
competence over its member states for dealing with ‘foreign direct investment’. This competence, part of
the EU’s common commercial policy, extended to bilateral investment treaties concluded between EU
member states and third countries (Extra-EU BITs). At the time, there were already over 1,000 Extra-EU
BITs in existence, whose future status required clarification. On 9 January 2013, a new European
regulation dealing with the status of Extra-EU BITs comes into force—Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements
for bilateral investment agreements between Member states and third countries—(the Regulation ). . . . The
default position is that Extra-EU BITs signed prior to December 2009 will remain in force until they are
replaced by new treaties between the EU itself and the relevant third countries (the EU BITs). Extra-EU
BITs signed after December 2009 will need to be reviewed by the Commission in order to ensure their
compliance with EU law.”).
122
See Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and the European Union: Towards a New
Generation of International Investment Agreements, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 639, 641 (2015) (“We are
witnessing the decline of the old EU member state ‘good practices’ and the dawning of a new era, that of
the EU’s ‘better practices.’”). The EU is moving from member-state-centric BITs to an inclusive EU-wide
118
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2016, the European Union and China have indicated that their BIT “will also
include rules on environmental and labor-related dimensions of foreign
investment.”124
a.

EU BITs with Labor Standards

Three EU members have entered into four BITs that include labor
provisions, including Austria, which has entered into three separate BITs.
i)

Austria-Tajikistan 2010 BIT

The 2010 Austria-Tajikistan BIT’s Article 5, Investment and Labor,
includes the following provisions:
1. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage an investment by weakening domestic labor laws.
2. For the purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means each
Contracting Party’s statutes or regulations, that are directly
related to the following internationally recognized labor rights:
a. the right of association;
b. the right to organize and to bargain collectively;

template for BITs that will create a uniform approach to investment protection. EU members states’
“established BIT practice is referred to as their ‘best practices.’ Member state bilateral investment treaties,
which are liberal instruments strongly protective of investor interests, have remained relatively unchanged
over the years, in contrast with their North American counterparts, which have come to represent a new
type of investment treaty, cognizant for the first time of the contracting parties’ right to regulate. With the
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the exercise of the EU’s new competence over the conclusion
of treaties covering foreign direct investment, Europe marks its distances with the old approach of the
member states and appears eager to set its own ‘model’. While broadly in harmony with the new generation
of North American investment treaties, the new EU policy aims to improve international investment law in
innovative ways, targeting both substantive and procedural protections, and leading to a yet newer
generation of international investment treaties.” Id. at 639.
123
See id. at 643. (“[T]he EU Minimum Platform on Investment served as a basis for the negotiation
of a number of FTAs, such as the 2008 EU–CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and
the 2010 EU–South Korea FTA. Indeed, these treaties contain provisions on the non-lowering of
environmental, safety, and labour standards, [and] references to the fight against corruption and the
International Labour Organization . . .”).
124
EU and China Agree on Scope of the Future Investment Deal, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Jan. 15,
2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1435 (In January 2016, the EU Commission
reported: “Meeting this week in Beijing, the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an
ambitious and comprehensive scope of the upcoming EU-China investment agreement and moved into a
phase of specific text-based negotiations.”).
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c. a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor;
d. labor protections for children and young people,
including a minimum age for the employment of children
and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of
child labor;
e. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health.
f. elimination of discrimination in employment and
occupation.125
The labor provisions in the Austria-Nigeria 2013 BIT 126 and the
Austria- Kyrgyz 2016 BIT127 are identical with that in the above Tajikistan
BIT.
ii)

Belgium-Luxembourg-Montenegro 2010 BIT

Belgium and Luxembourg, both EU Members, together entered into a
BIT agreement with Montenegro, 128 which also included a labor provision.
Under Article 1(6), the agreement defined key terms:
[t]he terms “labor legislation” shall mean legislation of the
Kingdom of Belgium, of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg or

See ABKOMMEN ZWISCHEN DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH UND DER REPUBLIK TADSCHIKISTAN ÜBER
DIE FÖRDERUNG UND DEN SCHUTZ VON INVESTITIONEN [AGREEMENT FOR THE PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN]
BUNDESGESETZBLATT III [BGBL III] No. 18/2012, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/III/2012/18/20120125
125

(Austria).
126
See Nationalrat [NR] [National Council] Gesetzgebungsperiode [GP] 24 Beilage [Blg] No. 2301,
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/I/I_02301/index.shtml (Austria) (Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment between the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of
Nigeria).
127
See ABKOMMEN ZWISCHEN DER REGIERUNG DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH UND DER REGIERUNG DER
KIRGISISCHEN REPUBLIK ÜBER DIE FÖRDERUNG UND DEN SCHUTZ VON INVESTITIONEN [AGREEMENT FOR
THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
AUSTRIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC] BUNDESGESETZBLATT III [BGBL III] No.
120/2017, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/III/2017/120/20170727 (Austria).
128
See Agreement between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the One Hand, and
Montenegro, on the Other Hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, Belg.-Lux.Montenegro, Feb. 16, 2010, Inv. Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/389/download.
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of Montenegro, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to
the following internationally recognized labor rights: a) the
right of association; b) the right to organize and bargain
collectively; c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor; d) a minimum age for the employment of
children; e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health. 129
And, the following provisions under Article 6:
1. Recognizing the right of each Contracting Party to establish
its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its labor legislation, each Contracting Party
shall strive to ensure that its legislation provide for labor
standards consistent with the internationally recognized
labor rights set forth in paragraph 6 of Article I and shall
strive to improve those labor standards in that light.
2. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing domestic labor legislation.
Accordingly, each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure
that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to
waive or derogate from, such legislation as an
encouragement for the establishment, maintenance or
expansion in its territory of an investment.
3. The Contracting Parties reaffirm their obligations as
members of the International Labor Organization and their
commitments under the International Labor Organization
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up. The Contracting Parties shall strive to
ensure that such labor principles and the internationally
recognized labor rights set forth in paragraph 6 of Article I
are recognized and protected by domestic legislation.
4. The Contracting Parties recognize that co-operation between
them provides enhanced opportunities to improve labor
standards. Upon request by either Contracting Party, the
other Contracting Party shall accept to hold expert

129

Id. art. 1(6).
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consultations on any matter falling under the purpose of this
Article.130
Interestingly, besides the recent promotion of “best practices” by the
European Union, and the inclusion of labor provisions in the four BITs by
Austria and Belgium-Luxembourg, it seems only the U.S. has heretofore
included labor provisions in its BITs; 131 and in that regard, the U.S.
continues negotiations for a BIT with China that include some labor
provisions which call for tougher standards. 132 It appears the European
Union and China in their new BIT will join the U.S., albeit with only
consultation as its means of enforceability and not with possible sanctions as
allowed by U.S. labor provisions.

130

Id. art. 6.
See Schott & Cimino, supra note 69, at 8. Before 2005, there was no U.S. BIT with labor
provisions, except for those with Uruguay and Rwanda. See Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. 06-110 1; Treaty Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. 12-101.
132
See Ronald C. Brown, International Influences and Obligations Arising from Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITS) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and ILO Standards, in FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR
RIGHTS IN CHINA—LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION AND CULTURAL LOGIC 169, 174–78 (Ulla Liukkunen &
Yifeng Chen eds., 2016). The Obama administration issued a revised U.S. model BIT in early 2012. See
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY (2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL
BIT]. These revisions will undoubtedly complicate ongoing discussions between the United States and
China and other emerging markets. The major changes of the latest revision include: strong transparency
obligations on regulations and other matters affecting investment and commitments to increase stakeholder
and public participation; expanded labor and environmental standards with commitments not to “waive or
derogate” from domestic labor and environmental laws, to “effectively enforce” such laws, and to
recognize international commitments under the International Labor Organization and other multilateral
agreements; and clarified specifications for state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and commitments not to
impose technology transfer requirements and to encourage investor participation in the development of
standards and regulations. See also Titi, supra note 104, at 643.
131

DECEMBER 2019

CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA

3.

Free Trade Agreements

a.

Background

95

The evolution of labor provisions in FTAs by the European Union has
transformed in recent years and their usefulness continues to grow, as
discussed below. 133
FTAs are the most economically significant aspect of EU trade
policy. They could cover as much as two thirds of EU trade if
all current negotiations are successfully concluded. They are
also the most important legally binding instruments that the EU
can use in its external policy. Labor provisions within EU FTAs
have “widened and deepened” over the past decade. This is
linked in part to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty which accorded greater
influence in trade policy-making to the European Parliament; an
institution which has emphasized the labor and human rights
dimensions of trade policy. 134
A significant point of departure for labor provisions in
EU FTAs was the 2008 CARIFORUM Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA). Unlike its predecessors, this agreement
contained more references to social policy norms and core labor
standards. It also allowed for disputes on social issues to be
referred to independent experts, and institutionalized dialogue
about the trade agreement within a civil society mechanism
(CSM). Since the negotiation of the 2011 EU-Korea FTA such
provisions have been packaged . . . in a Trade and Sustainable
Development (TSD) chapter. TSD chapters have become an
integral part of the EU's ‘new generation’ trade agreements.
Such chapters were present in finalized agreements with a
further 18 countries as of July 2017, with bold claims made
about their efficacy. TSD chapters are meant to ensure that
economic growth goes hand in hand with higher labor

133

See generally Lina Lorenzoni Escobar, Sustaintable Development and International Investment: A
Legal Analysis of the EU’s Policy from FTAs to CETA, 136 BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2015).
134
Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 260.
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standards, making trade policy “not just about interests but also
about values.” 135
The TSD chapters in EU FTAs have a tripartite format. First, there are
substantive standards committing to ILO core labor standards and the
Decent Work Agenda; second, there are obligations and procedural
commitments relating to implementation; and third, there are institutional
mechanisms to resolve disputes.
All agreements since the EU-Korea FTA have a tripartite
format. Committees of state/EU officials from the two parties
are established to oversee the implementation of the TSD
chapter. These are advised by a CSM that takes the form of a
Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) including representatives of
business, trade unions, non‐governmental organizations
(NGOs) and occasionally academia, with the DAGs of the two
parties meeting together on an annual basis. Finally, there is an
expert panel that investigates complaints made by the parties
and makes recommendations on them. The implication of the
agreement text is that these institutions will interact to
effectively implement the TSD chapter.136
b.

Japan, CETA, and South Korea

For purposes of comparison, the European Union’s recent FTAs with
Japan, Canada, and South Korea are discussed below.
i)

EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (FTA)

On July 17, 2018, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
(“EPA”, also called FTA) was signed by the parties.137
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that the agreement “shows
the world the unshaken political will of Japan and the European Union to
lead the world as the champions of free trade at a time when protectionism

135

Id. at 261.
Id.
137
See Agreement Between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, July 17,
2018, 2018 O.J. (L 330) 3 [hereinafter EU-Japan EPA].
136
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has spread.”138 The trade agreement is the biggest ever negotiated by the
European Union and will create an open trade zone covering over 600
million people. President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker
stated:
The document we signed today is much more than a trade
agreement. It is of course a tool that will create opportunities
for our companies, our workers and our citizens and that will
boost the European and Japanese economies. But it is also a
statement. For its content, its scope and also its timing. It is a
statement by two likeminded partners that together represent
nearly a third of the world's GDP and reiterate their
commitment to uphold the highest standards in areas such as
labor, safety, environmental or consumer protection.139
The labor standard and dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 16 are
highlighted below in summary form. 140
1. Source of labor standards:
a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-up of 1998 141
b. ILO Decent Work Agenda in accordance with the ILO
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of
2008 142
2. Obligations:
a. the four core labor rights 143

138

Hiroshi Hiyama, EU, Japan Sign Major Trade Deal in “Message Against Protectionism”,
YAHOO! NEWS (July 17, 2018), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/eu-japan-sign-massive-trade-deal-us-puts062523433--finance.html (Abe continued, saying that “Japan and the EU will form a united front against a
US threat to impose tariffs on key products such as cars.”).
139
EU and Japan Sign Economic Partnership Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N (July 16, 2018),
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4526_en.htm.
140
See EU-Japan EPA, supra note 117. A year earlier a summary document was sent to Member
States and the European Parliament for information and which labor provisions mirror the 2018 final
agreement. See also EU and Japan Sign Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 119.
141
See EU-Japan EPA, supra note 117, art. 16.1.
142
Id.
143
Id. art. 16.3(2).
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b. Parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the
other Conventions each Party considers appropriate. 144
c. shall not encourage trade or investment by relaxing or
lowering the level of protection provided by their
respective environmental or labor laws and regulations.
To that effect, the Parties shall not waive or otherwise
derogate from those laws and regulations or fail to
effectively enforce them through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction145
d. effectively implement its law and practices 146
e. not encourage trade or investment by weakening or
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law147
3. Labor Dispute Resolution
a. Disputes for labor violations: “In the event of
disagreement between the Parties on any matter
regarding the interpretation or application of this Chapter,
the Parties shall only have recourse to the procedures set
out in this Article and Article 16.18. The provisions of
this Chapter shall not be subject to dispute settlement
under Chapter 21.”148
b. Filing party: “Parties” 149
c. Procedures: Joint dialogue between civil societies,
government consult, then mediation by panel of
experts150
d. Decision-Maker: Panel of Experts: “Each Party is
responsible for ensuring a balanced representation of
independent economic, social and environmental
stakeholders, including employers’ and workers’

144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. art. 16.3(3).
Id. art. 16.2(3).
Id. art. 16.3(5).
Id. art. 16.3(6).
Id. art. 16.17(1).
Id. art. 16.3(1).
Id. arts. 16.16, 16.17, & 16.18.
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organizations and environmental groups, in the advisory
group or groups.” 151
e. Upon determination of violation: “A Party may request in
writing consultations with the other Party on any matter
concerning the interpretation and application of this
Chapter. The Party requesting consultations shall set out
the reasons for the request, including identification of the
matter and an indication of its factual and legal basis,
specifying the relevant provisions of this Chapter.”152
f. Decision made public: “The Parties shall ensure that the
solutions reached through the consultations under this
Article will be jointly made publicly available, unless the
Parties agree otherwise.”153
g. Sanctions: No penalty, only persuasion, not coercion.
“The Parties shall discuss actions or measures to resolve
the matter in question, taking into account the panel's
final report and its suggestions. Each Party shall inform
the other Party and its own domestic advisory group or
groups of any follow-up actions or measures no later than
three months after the date of issuance of the final report.
The follow-up actions or measures shall be monitored by
the Committee. The domestic advisory group or groups
and the Joint Dialogue may submit their observations in
this regard to the Committee.” 154
Canada-EU and its Member States (“CETA”) 155

ii)

The labor standard and dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 23 are
highlighted below in summary form. 156
1. Source of Labor Standards:

151

Id. 16.15 (2).
Id. 16.17(2).
153
Id. art. 16.18.
154
Id. art. 16.18(6).
155
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada, of the One Part, and the
European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter
CETA].
156
Id. art. 23.3(1)(a)–(d).
152

100

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-up of 1998 157
b. ILO Decent Work Agenda in accordance with the ILO
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of
2008 158
2. Obligations:
a. To legally protect the four core labor rights 159
b. To promote the objectives of the ILO Decent Work
Agenda in accordance with the 2008 ILO Declaration on
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization: 160 (a) health and
safety at work, including the prevention of occupational
injury or illness and compensation in cases of such injury
or illness; (b) establishment of acceptable minimum
employment standards for wage earners, including those
not covered by a collective agreement; and, (c) nondiscrimination in respect of working conditions,
including for migrant workers.161
c. Parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the
other Conventions that are classified as “up-to-date” by
the ILO162
d. Effectively implement its laws and practices 163
e. Not encourage trade or investment by weakening or
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law164
3. Labor Dispute Resolution:
a. Disputes for labor violations: “For any dispute that arises
under this Chapter, the Parties shall only have recourse to
the rules and procedures provided in this Chapter.”165
b. Filing party: “Parties means, on the one hand, the
European Union or its Member States or the European

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. art. 23.3(1).
Id. art. 23.3(2).
Id. art. 23.3(1)(a)–(d).
Id. art. 23.3(2).
Id.
Id. art. 23.3(4).
Id. art. 23.4(1)–(2).
Id. art. 23.4(2)–(3).
Id. art. 23.11(1).
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Union and its Member States within their respective
areas of competence as derived from the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EU
Party’), and on the other hand, Canada.”166
c. Procedures: Consultation between governments, then
mediation by a panel of experts [selected as part of the
FTA procedures]167
d. Decision-Maker: the terms of reference of the Panel of
Experts are as follows: “to examine, in the light of the
relevant provisions of Chapter Twenty-Three (Trade and
Labour), the matter referred to in the request for the
establishment of the Panel of Experts, and to deliver a
report, in accordance with Article 23.10 (Panel of
Experts) of Chapter Twenty-Three (Trade and Labour),
that makes recommendations for the resolution of the
matter.”168 Each Party shall convene a new or consult its
domestic labor or sustainable development advisory
groups, to seek views and advice on issues relating to this
Chapter. Those groups shall comprise independent
representative organizations of civil society in a balanced
representation of employers, unions, labor and business
organizations, as well as other relevant stakeholders as
appropriate. They may submit opinions and make
recommendations on any matter related to this Chapter
on their own initiative. 169
e. Upon determination of violation: If the final report of the
Panel of Experts determines that a Party has not
conformed with its obligations under this Chapter, the
Parties shall engage in discussions and shall endeavor,
within three months of the delivery of the final report, to
identify appropriate measures or, if appropriate, to decide
upon a mutually satisfactory action plan.170

166
167
168
169
170

Id. art. 1.1.
Id. arts. 23.9 & 23.10.
Id. art. 23.10 (8).
Id. art. 23.8 (4).
Id. art. 23.10 (12).
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f. Decision made public: Each Party shall make the final
report publicly available within 30 days of its delivery. 171
g. Sanctions: No penalty, only persuasion, not coercion 172
The EU FTA with South Korea 173

iii)

The EU-South Korea FTA has been provisionally applied since July
2011 and was formally ratified in December 2015. 174 Chapter thirteen
contains the labor standard provisions, highlighted below in summary form.
1. Source of Labor Standards:
a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-up of 1998 175
b. 2006 Ministerial Declaration of the UN Economic and
Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work 176
2. Obligations:
a. to protect the four core labor rights ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-up of 1998177
b. to promote the objectives ILO Decent Work Agenda in
accordance with the ILO Declaration on Social Justice
for a Fair Globalization of 2008178

171

Id. art. 23.10 (11).
Id. art. 23.11. See also id. arts. 1.1, 23.1–23.4, 23.8–23.10, & 8.1 (Treatment of Investors and
Covered Investments). In contrast to CETA’s binding investment court system designed to protect foreign
investors, the labor chapter’s compliance mechanism relies on a non-binding process of cooperation, dialog
and recommendations to address labor rights violations. See Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free
COMM’N
(Feb.
26,
2019),
Trade
Agreement
(CETA),
EUROPEAN
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.
172

173

Countries and Regions: South Korea, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 7, 2019),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/. For an assessment of that
agreement, see generally Giovanni Gruni, Labor Standards in the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement
Pushing Labor Standards into Global Trade Law?, 5 KOREAN J. INT’L COMP. L. 100, 100–19 (2017).
174 Countries and Regions: South Korea, supra note 153. See Free Trade Agreement Between the
European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part, Sep.
16, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6 [hereinafter EU-South Korea FTA].
175
176
177
178

EU-South Korea FTA, supra note 174, at art. 13.4(3).
Id. art. 13.4(2).
Id. art. 13.4(3)
Id. art. 13.4(2)
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c. to ensure that its labor law and practices embody and
provide protection for the above [core labor]
obligations 179
d. to recognize and promote the 2006 Ministerial
Declaration of the UN Economic and Social Council on
Full Employment and Decent Work180
e. parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the
other Conventions that are classified as ‘up-to-date’ by
the ILO181
f. effectively implement its law and practices 182
g. not encourage trade or investment by weakening or
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law183
3. Labor Dispute Resolution:
a. Disputes for labor violations: “For any matter arising
under this Chapter, the Parties shall only have recourse to
the procedures provided for in Articles 13.14 and
13.15” 184
b. Filing Party: “Parties” 185
c. Procedures: Consultation between governments, then
mediation by a panel of experts [selected as part of the
FTA procedures 186
d. Decision-maker: “The Domestic Advisory Group(s)
comprise(s) independent representative organizations of
civil society in a balanced representation of environment,
labor and business organizations as well as other relevant
stakeholders.”187
e. Panel of Experts: “The experts shall be independent of,
and not be affiliated with or take instructions from, either

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id. art. 13.4(3).
Id. art. 13.4(2)
Id. art. 13.4(3).
Id. art. 13.7(1).
Id. art. 13.7(2).
Id. art. 13.16.
Id. art. 13.2(1).
Id. arts. 13.4 & 13.5.
Id. art. 13.12(5).
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Party or organizations represented in the Domestic
Advisory Group(s).”188
f. Upon Determination of Violation: “If a Party considers
that the matter needs further discussion, that Party may
request that the Committee on Trade and Sustainable
Development be convened to consider the matter by
delivering a written request to the contact point of the
other Party.” 189
g. Decision Made Public: the report of the Panel of Experts
shall be made available to the Domestic Advisory
Group(s) of the Parties. 190
h. Sanctions: No penalty, only persuasion, not coercion.
“Recognizing the importance of cooperating on traderelated aspects of social and environmental policies in
order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement.”191
4.

International Standards

a.

ILO

As a member of the ILO, China has ratified four of the eight core
labor conventions,192 while all EU Members have ratified all eight core labor
conventions.193 A distinction can be made between an FTA commitment to
honor the ILO Declaration, which incorporates all the conventions 194 and
honors specific convention (but is interpreted as providing only general
obligations), with a non-FTA commitment. Commitments to specific
conventions are interpreted as forming more precise obligations.

188

Id. art. 13.15(3).
Id. art. 13.14(3).
190
Id. art. 13.15(2).
191
Id. art. 13.11.
192
See Ratifications for China, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::
NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
193
See INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED CORE LABOUR
STANDARDS
IN
THE
EUROPEAN
UNION
1
(2011),
https://www.itucSee
also
csi.org/IMG/pdf/Final_draft_ICLS_in_the_European_Union_-_6_and_8_July_2011_2_.pdf.
Ratifications by Convention, supra note 192; ILO, THE ILO AND THE EU, PARTNERS FOR DECENT WORK
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8 (2012), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilobrussels/documents/publication/wcms_195135.pdf.
194
Brown, China-U.S. Implementation of ILO Standards by BITs and Pieces (FTAs), supra note 112,
at 171–73.
189
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OECD

The OECD consists of thirty-six member countries 195 and assists these
countries to foster prosperity and fight poverty through data collection,
review, standards setting, and agreements for cooperation, ranging from
agriculture to taxation. 196 China was invited by the OECD in 2007 as a “Key
Partner” (not a Member) to strengthen cooperation through OECD
"Enhanced Engagement" programs. 197 As an active Key Partner, China
participates in eleven significant OECD bodies and projects. Likewise, the
European Union, as an organization (not a state), is not a Member; nor does
it have the right to vote or officially take part in the adoption of legal
instruments submitted to the Council for adoption. Nonetheless, “its
participation goes well beyond that of an observer.”198
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (“MNCs”) 199 were
issued to guide governmental and business conduct through implementing

195
See Member Countries, supra note 175. (member countries include Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
196
Bill Witherell, Director for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, Remarks at the CFO
17,
2004),
Strategies:
Corporate
Accountability
Forum
(May
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/32034047.pdf (“Reflecting the great
heterogeneity in both OECD and non-OECD countries, the new Principles retain their non-binding,
principles-based approach, which recognizes the need to adapt implementation to varying legal, economic
and
cultural
circumstances.”).
See
generally
Organisational
Structure,
OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/structure/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). The OECD uses information on various
topics to fight poverty, help governments prosper, and prevent financial instability. The organization
monitors the economies of member and non-member nations, and the Secretariat collects and analyzes
information on different aspects of society. See generally What is the OECD?, CORP. FIN. INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/oecd/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2019).
197

See People's Republic of China, ORG.
http://www.oecd.org/china/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).

FOR

ECON.

CO-OPERATION

AND

DEV.,

198

European Union and the OECD, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/eu/european-union-and-oecd.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2019).
199
See generally OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011). Beginning
in 1976, the OECD developed working relationships with the ILO, the International Organization for
Standardization, the World Bank, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, the UN Global
Compact, UN Finance Initiative, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the International Coordinating
Committee of Human Rights Institutions. See OECD, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 11 (2013).
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procedures. “National Contact Points”200 hold Member states and MNCs,
and their contractors,201 responsible to meet certain labor standards for their
workers. Under OECD standards, Article V Employment and Industrial
Relations states workers should have labor rights that mirror the ILO’s core
labor rights, which also require enterprises to use “due diligence”202 in
effectuating those rights. 203 While there are numbers of successful resolution
of labor disputes through the OECD consultation, mediation, investigation,
and recommendation procedures, the Guidelines remain voluntary. Under
the Guidelines, enterprises should carry out due diligence to identify, prevent
and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts on human rights, industrial
issues including labor standards, etc. Enterprises should also carry out “due
diligence” in relation to their suppliers and other business relations, to seek
to prevent or mitigate adverse impact that is directly linked to their
operations, products or services. However, due diligence without
consequences for failure seem ill-considered and some countries, such as
France, have instituted legislative consequences. 204
c.

WBO

The World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework (ESF)
launched on October 1, 2018 and provides detailed labor and working
condition requirements for loan recipients, including grievance
mechanisms. 205 The 2018 Framework, which will gradually replace the

200

See National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/ncps.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
201
See generally OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 199, at
35 (Chapter V. Employment and Industrial Relations). See also generally Ronald C. Brown, OECD
National Contact Point, Denmark: Specific Instance Notified by Clean Clothes Campaign Denmark and
Active Consumers Regarding the Activities of the PWT Group, Final Statement, 17 October 2016, 3 INT’L
LABOR RIGHTS CASE L. 233 (2017).
202
OECD, OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 15–19 (2018),
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf
(outlining practical application and discussing due diligence obligation).
203
See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 199, at 35–37.
204
See Ronald C. Brown, Due Diligence “Hard Law” Remedies for MNC Labor Chain Workers, 22
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 119, 120, 154 (2018).
205
THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 31–36 (2017),
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/837721522762050108/Environmental-and-Social-Framework.pdf
(“Where national law restricts workers’ organizations, the project will not restrict project workers from
developing alternative mechanisms to express their grievances and protect their rights regarding working
conditions and terms of employment. The Borrower should not seek to influence or control these
alternative mechanisms.”).
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Safeguard policies, provides improved protections for the most vulnerable
people, and for the environment.
These requirements are applicable to China in that as of June 30,
2018, the bank’s cumulative lending to China was nearly $62 billion for
more than 400 projects.206 The portfolio is concentrated in environment,
transportation, urban development, rural development, energy, water
resources management, and human development.207 The detailed labor and
working condition requirements cover: 208
1. Working conditions and management of
relationships
a. Terms and conditions of employment
b. Nondiscrimination and equal opportunity
c. Worker’s organizations
2. Protecting the workplace
a. Child labor and minimum wage
b. Forced labor
3. Grievance mechanism 209
4. Occupational Health and Safety (“OHS”)
5. Contracted workers
6. Community workers
7. Primary supply workers210

206

worker

Emel Akan, World Bank Will Cut Loans to China, Bank’s New President Says, THE EPOCH TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theepochtimes.com/world-bank-will-cut-loans-to-china-says-banks-newpresident_2875974.html.
207
See Projects & Programs: China, THE WORLD BANK, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projectsoperations/projects-list?searchTerm=china [https://perma.cc/NZE9-6VUC] (last visited Dec. 1, 2019) (the
first twenty projects listed are those in China).
208
See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra
note 205, at 32–36 (Labor and Working Conditions). Some are concerned about the efficacy of
enforcement of these standards.
209
See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra
note 205, at 34.
210
See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra
note 205, at 31–36. See also THE WORLD BANK, ESS2: LABOUR AND WORKING CONDITIONS,
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/149761530216793411/ESF-GN2-June-2018.pdf. Public comment by the
International Trade Union Confederation/Global Unions regarding the draft Guidance Note for ESS2:
Labour and Working Conditions was made in December 2017, and suggested modifications were offered.
These included, for example, adding confidentiality and anti-retaliation provisions to the grievance
procedures. ITUC, PUBLIC COMMENT DECEMBER 2017 BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION
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The enforcement process over prior years seems to have been to
improve labor systems as opposed to redressing individuals’ grievances; it is
not yet clear whether the 2018 procedures will be different.211
IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

Time for an EU-China BIT and FTA with Labor Provisions?

The current opportunities and timing for growth and mutual benefit
flowing to the European Union and China––and their workers––from a BIT
and an FTA may have never been better geopolitically and economically.
Developments, described above, suggest it is time to move forward and
accelerate the commercial traffic along a key corridor of China’s Old Silk
Road and better harness the EU-China billion dollar per day trade and its
expanding FDI. The apparent obstacles of China’s trade practices and
European Union’s diverse political makeup can be seen as challenges to
overcome. Beginning with completion of the EU-China BIT or its absorption
into an EU-China FTA, the parties with renewed efforts can reach
accommodations on an FTA. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that
the inclusion of labor protection provisions will not be an obstacle as the
parties reportedly are now drafting it in their new BIT; and, their current
labor provisions do not significantly differ. This result is also supported by a
number of international labor obligations emanating from the ILO, OECD,
WBO, and prior FTAs.
Already, China is engaged in TiSA and OECD discussions dealing
with fairness and transparency in trade. Both the European Union and China

CONFEDERATION/GLOBAL UNIONS REGARDING THE DRAFT GUIDANCE NOTE FOR ESS2: LABOUR AND
WORKING CONDITIONS 9, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/338031515447125004/ESFGuidanceNote
CommentsonESS1ESS2ESS10byITUCandGlobalUnionspartnerorganizationsDec152017.pdf.
211
There is no reported consensus yet on the effect of the new Guidance. See World Bank Leaves
Door Open to Slavery in Paraguay, ITUC (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.ituc-csi.org/world-bank-leavesdoor-open-to (“Questions have arisen regarding WBO enforcement. The World Bank’s private lending arm
claimed that its investment in Minerva would help improve conditions in the Chaco. However, five years
later the problems of modern slavery and environmental destruction persist, and little progress has been
made on supply chain responsibility. As part of the investment package, Minerva agreed to an
“Environmental and Social Action Plan”. Among other actions, it included the undertaking of a “supply
chain verification system” as well as of a mapping exercise to identify those regions and suppliers more
likely to allow child and forced labor. However, the company missed the deadline to meet these
commitments. Today, it is unclear whether the IFC is holding Minerva accountable and ensuring the
implementation of the measures necessary to prevent forced and child labor in the beef supply chain.”).
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have had for some years, high-level committees working on the issues of the
FTA. Many new regional FTAs (such as CPTTP, RCEP, and TTIP) are
raising the issue of who will write the rules of commerce for the future
years. While differences in domestic labor standards can be described,212 it is
argued that labor provisions in an FTA or BIT can enhance and elevate labor
protections. At the same time, they will not thwart accommodation and
agreement on an EU-China FTA or BIT, as for better or worse, from past
practice, these treaties are general obligations with only dialogue and
cooperation used for their enforcement. Additionally, some of the EU
Members’ labor practices and standards are quite like those in parts of
China, both positively and negatively. Other more controversial areas of
trade could be accommodated by a gradual phase-in, such as in the recent
EU-Japan FTA where some provisions are phased in over 15 years. 213
Comparing past BITs of China and the European Union, respectively,
neither includes labor provisions. However, three EU Members, Austria and
Belgium-Luxembourg (in tandem), have concluded BITs containing labor
provisions that are quite like those in the recent EU FTAs and China’s FTArelated MOUs regarding labor standards and dispute resolution. Currently,
the European Union is moving toward a new protocol for BITs that include
“best practices,” though it is not labor specific. 214 Recently in CETA, the
European Union has included investment provisions in the FTA itself.215

212

See generally CATHERINE BARNARD, EU EMPLOYMENT LAW (4th ed. 2012) (for information
regarding the EU).
213
EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU-JAPAN EPA – THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE (2017),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155693.doc.pdf (stating tariffs of up to 28.9% will
be eliminated over fifteen years). See also Jim Brunsden & Valentina Romei, Why the EU’s Agreement
with Japan Is A Big Deal, FIN. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/572fef42-6260-11e791a7-502f7ee26895.
214
See Titi, supra note 104, at 41 (discussing how the European Commission urged that the EU
should follow the available “best practices” to ensure that no EU investor would be worse off than they
would be under Member States’ BITs).
215
See CETA, supra note 135; CETA Chapter Summaries, GLOB. AFFAIRS CAN. (July 14, 2017),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cetaaecg/chapter_summary-resume_chapitre.aspx?lang=eng#a8 (explaining how since the Lisbon Treaty the
EU has begun negotiating EU-wide bilateral investment agreements, including in form of investment
provisions in its free trade agreements. CETA was the first EU agreement signed by the EU containing
investment protection provisions. CETA established a new investment court system (“ICS”)). See also
RODERICK EDWARD & LAURA PUCCIO, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, FROM ARBITRATION TO THE INVESTMENT
COURT
SYSTEM
(ICS):
THE
EVOLUTION
OF
CETA
RULES
13–28
(2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf
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Eventually, as negotiators in an EU-China BIT and FTA attempt to
reach an accommodation, including on labor provisions, China falls in the
camp of leaving such social issues outside the commercial aspects of a trade
agreement, such as is done with the WTO, and by Asian countries
generally. 216 This is reflected in China having no labor provisions in 8 of its
13 FTAs.217 Of China’s five FTA-MOU agreements with labor provisions,
two have labor standards and enforcement watered down; 218 while the other
three agreements have labor provisions like those in EU FTAs. 219 So, in sum,
both the European Union and China have labor provisions wherein they
agree to obligations under ILO standards, agree to cooperate and consult if
they disagree, and to use consultation as an enforcement mechanism.
1.

China

China’s use of labor protections in FTAs has varied over recent years.
While its labor provisions with Chile and Iceland are vague, where the
parties merely agree to cooperate on mutual labor matters of interest,220
another somewhat progressive labor provision is found in the 2008 ChinaNew Zealand MOU, 221 where China clearly commits to ILO core labor
standards and both parties explicitly agree to enable unions and other
organizations to participate in identifying and undertaking cooperative
activities.

(discussing how concerns were raised regarding the differences between ISDS and domestic court. These
relate both to the different treatment of foreign and domestic investors and to uncertainty regarding the
compatibility of the ICS system with the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order).
216
See Brown, supra note 80, at 96–112 (noting an exception when Asian countries negotiate an
agreement with a non-Asian developed country, such as the U.S., Australia, or the EU).
217
See Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 14–17.
218
China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76, art. 108 (the Iceland Agreement with China enhances labor
communication and cooperation); see also China-Chile FTA, supra note 76 (the China-Chile FTA’s MOU
agrees to cooperation).
219
See N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation, supra note 103 (the New Zealand-China
Agreement reaffirms ILO obligations and recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or
investment by weakening or failing to enforce labor laws, and that it is or use labor laws, regulations,
policies and practices for trade protectionist purposes. Like the EU, the enforcement mechanism is
consultation).
220
China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76, art. 108; see also China-Chile MOU on Labour and Social
Security Cooperation, supra note 97; China-Chile FTA supra note 76, art. 2.
221
See N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation, supra note 103.
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China’s one FTA and MOU on labor with a European economy,
Switzerland in 2013, may reflect the likely future accommodation with
European Union in an EU-China FTA or BIT. It contains a commitment to
the ILO Declaration and its core labor standards and, also, reaffirms the
Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work of 2006 and the ILO
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.222 The Parties also
agree to a broad range of obligations to enforce their labor laws, to not
encourage trade by reducing labor standards, and to not use domestic labor
laws to further trade protectionism. Issues over its implementation are to be
resolved though cooperation, consultation, and dialogue––a dispute
resolution scheme similarly embraced by EU FTA labor provisions.
2.

European Union

Labor provisions in the Social Dimension (Trade and Sustainable
Development (“TSD”) provisions in EU FTAs have developed and changed
over the years.
The 2008 CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement
(EPA) contained more references to social policy norms and
core labor standards than EU’s prior FTAs. It provided for labor
issues to be referred to independent experts, and dialogue
within a civil society mechanism (CSM) … and it embodied
EU’s ‘new generation’ trade agreements to be found in 18
countries by 2017, with bold claims made about their
efficacy. 223
Typically, they include three primary provisions: first, commitments and
obligations to labor standards tied to the ILO; second, a process to monitor
the agreement, using cooperation, dialogue, and transparency; and thirdly,
procedures and mechanisms for resolving labor disputes. Dispute resolution
provisions are separate and different for labor than for trade, and since the
EU-Korea FTA, 224 all EU FTAs have that tripartite format. 225

222

See China-Swiss FTA, supra note 76.
Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 261.
224
See id. Committees of state/EU officials from the two parties are established to oversee the
implementation of the TSD chapter. These are advised by a CSM that takes the form of a Domestic
Advisory Group (“DAG”) including representatives of business, trade unions, NGOs, and occasionally
academia, with the DAGs of the two parties meeting together on an annual basis. Finally, there is an expert
223
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Perhaps the most comprehensive labor provisions are found in the
2016 CETA agreement.226 The parties committed to the ILO Declaration and
core labor standards, the Decent Work Agenda (covering health and safety
standards), and obligated themselves to enforce ILO core labor standards
and their labor laws, promote the Decent Work Agenda, make sustained
efforts to ratify the ILO core labor standards and other Conventions
classified as “up-to-date’ by the ILO, and not to reduce labor protections or
use labor laws to encourage trade or investment. The labor dispute resolution
process authorizes either Party to initiate the processes of consultation, to
consult with its domestic advisory group, including labor unions, and to have
mediation by a panel of experts. Decisions are made public and no sanctions
or penalties are provided. This differs from U.S. FTAs, which have a unified
dispute resolution process for trade and labor and provide for penalties for
violations. 227
The Parties in the 2011 EU-South Korea FTA 228 and the 2018 EUJapan FTA have labor obligations and dispute resolution procedures like
those in CETA above.229

panel that investigates complaints made by the parties and makes recommendations on them. The
implication of the agreement text is that these institutions will interact to effectively implement the TSD
chapter.
225
See CETA, supra note 135. European Commission Dispute resolution for trade disputes has the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”), where rights are vested in by corporations and obligations are
binding for states and enforceable by the investors; labor dispute resolution is left for consultation.
Likewise, investment disputes have an enforceable remedy. See also Michele Faioli, Atlantic Transitions
for Law and Labor: CETA First and TTIP Second?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL TRADE AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS STUDIES IN EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 71, 88 (Adalberto Perulli & Tiziano Treu
eds., 2018).
226 See generally CETA, supra note 135.
227 Brown, supra note 112, at 176. This also contrasts to CETA’s binding investment court system
designed to protect foreign investors, the labor chapter’s compliance mechanism relies on a non-binding
process of cooperation, dialog and recommendations to address labor rights violations. See CETA, supra
note 135, art. 8.10.
228 For example, see discussion on South Korea in Gruni, supra note 153. A common argument is that
the labor clause does include several innovative features which entrench the presence of labor law in
international trade agreements. However, the clause remains mainly about political cooperation and
struggles to define enforceable legal obligations on states. This is so because of the exceptions in the first
part of the clause, the vagueness of the labor rights obligations and the lack of an enforcement mechanism.
229
See EU-Japan EPA, supra 117, art. 21.
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The easiest way for the European Union and China to move forward
on trade and investment talks is to finalize their BIT negotiations. Certainly,
the inclusion of labor provisions should not be an obstacle as China already
has embraced them in its FTA-MOU with Switzerland and several other
countries. While the European Union has not yet included them solely in a
BIT, though three Members of the European Union have included them, it
has included them in their FTAs and both China and the European Union
have indicated they will include labor provisions in its EU-China BIT.
B.

Significance of Labor Provisions in FTAs

There are many studies and diverse points of view on the practical
usefulness of labor provisions in trade agreements. One such study
concluded that for EU bilateral trade agreements in force prior to 2010 those
“with labor provisions have a positive and statistically significant impact on
workers’ rights in signatory nations.” 230 It further reported that “what causes
this positive effect is the way state officials are educated about, and
normalized into, upholding labor standards.” 231 Swiss unions state they look
forward to their educational interaction with Chinese employers.
Other studies within that study challenge these conclusions. Reports
of serious shortcomings under the labor provisions of individual FTAs,
where individual states claimed standards were lowered, were treated as
“window dressing, were under-funded, and were “watered-down.”232
Interestingly, they also note the lack of enforceability is also raised as
problematic by the other party to the EU FTAs. “[A]t the 2017 civil society
forum of the EU-Korea FTA some participants turned the discussion toward

230
Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 262. See also generally Damian Raess & Dora Sari, Labor
Provisions in Trade Agreements (LABPTA): Introducing a New Dataset, 9 GLOBAL POL’Y 451 (2018)
(comparing types of labor provisions); Damian Raess, Andreas Dür, & Dora Sari, Protecting Labor Rights
in Preferential Trade Agreements, 13 REV. INT’L ORG. 143 (2018).
231
Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 262.
232
See id. at 263. A report ultimately critical of the value of EU’s TSD provisions concluded,
“[O]verall, we found no evidence that the existence of TSD chapters have led to improvements in labor
standards governance in any of our case studies, nor did we find any evidence that the institutionalization
of opportunities for learning and socialization between the parties was creating a significant prospect of
longer‐term change . . . .” Id. at 273. Should the EU therefore seek to put more of its market power behind
its labor governance strategy? Such an approach could in part be realized by the most common suggestion
for reform from European interviewees involved in the labor movement; namely, increasing the
enforceability of the TSD chapter by giving the EU the ability to withdraw preferential access to its market
if labor standards are violated.

114

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

inadequate protection of workers within the European Union, complicating
the assumption that such provisions are essentially externally orientated.”233
This could prove prescient on an EU-China FTA, as labor conditions in
some EU Member states are not dissimilar to some areas in China. In fact,
the European Trade Union Confederation (“ETUC”) agrees with the
shortcoming of the lack of enforcement and urges penalties be added.234
Of course, changes could be made to improve enforceability of the
labor provisions, such as looking to a modified dispute system allowing
direct access to both trade and labor issues that would allow third-parties,
such as labor unions, direct access to dispute procedures. In addition,
allowing penalties for violations, empowering an outside panel or court (like
CETA Investment provisions) to decide cases, or perhaps empowering NCPs
as in OECD to make recommendations following investigations, would
strengthen the enforcement mechanism. 235 However, to be clear, there are
two separate questions: 1) whether current enforcement procedures are
sufficient and need modification; and 2) the question raised in this paper,
whether current practices of European Union and China regarding inclusion
of labor provisions in a BIT or FTA would be an obstacle to finding an
accommodation so as to finalize the agreements. The conclusion is a clear––
there is no obstacle.
C.

The European Union and China: Reaching Accomodation on an EUChina Labor Provision

Considering the European Union’s 2016 CETA and ChinaSwitzerland’s 2013 FTA and 2013 MOU are the most comprehensive labor
protection treaties for each, a brief comparison shows there is much in

233

Id. at 274. See also generally James Harrison et al., Labour Standards in EU Free Trade
Agreements: Working Towards What End?, 5 GREAT INSIGHTS MAG. 6 (2016), https://ecdpm.org/wpcontent/uploads/Great-Insights-Vol5-Issue6-December-2016.pdf.
234
See ETUC, ETUC ASSESSMENT ON COMMISSION’S NON PAPER ON TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
(TSD)
CHAPTERS
IN
EU
FREE
TRADE
AGREEMENTS
(2018),
https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-assessment-commissions-non-paper-trade-and-sustainabledevelopment-tsd-chapters-eu (it did so in its urging of inclusion in CETA). See also Angela Pfisterand &
Éva Dessewffy, Labour Rights, in MAKING SENSE OF CETA 65–68 (2d ed. 2016).
235
See Axel Marx, Franz Ebert, & Nicolas Hachez, Dispute Settlement for Labour Provisions in EU
Free Trade Agreements, 5 POL. & GOVERNANCE 49, 52 (2017) (arguing that there is a need to rethink the
dispute settlement mechanisms related to labor provisions if their effectiveness is to be increased).
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common, and accommodation of an agreeable labor provision is completely
feasible. Most of the provisions are the same, except as outlined below.
The China-Switzerland MOU has an additional provision stating that
labor laws will not be used for trade protectionist purposes, 236 it has a
detailed list of possible cooperative activities, and it has fewer express
procedures for dispute resolution provisions, but likewise authorizes
consultation for alleged violations or disagreements. 237
CETA has a more detailed step procedure within which consultation
and mediation take place238 and it explicitly authorizes use of a domestic
labor development advisory group that can include labor unions. 239 A
recommended decision is made by an internal panel of experts. 240 There are
no enforcement or penalty provisions. Either Party shall make the decision
public within thirty days of its delivery. 241 With such similar provisions,
accommodation would likely only need to find the right language to express
their common interests, already reflected in their prior agreements.
V.

CONCLUSION

The opportunity for closer economic relations between China and the
European Union is now. The reasons are economic, geopolitical, and for the
benefit of employers and workers on both sides. The opportunity must be
boldly seized through a negotiated BIT or its inclusion within an EU-China
FTA.
While both sides will have their domestic political hurdles to
surmount, this article shows that one potential political and economic
obstacle, labor provisions in the Social Dimension provisions, is largely nonexistent under the current practices of European Union and China.
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China-Swiss MOU, supra note 82, art. 2(6).
Id. art. 4(2).
238
CETA, supra note 135, arts. 23.9 & 23.10.
239
Id. art. 23.8(4).
240
Id. art. 23.10.
241
Id. art. 23.10(11).
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The EU-China BIT and FTA can pave the silk road with a model for
others to follow.

